Schiavo\u27s Right to Refuse Food and Water: Ascendancy of the Artificial Natural Person by Joseph S. Bell
Liberty University Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 10
2006
Schiavo's Right to Refuse Food and Water:
Ascendancy of the Artificial Natural Person
Joseph S. Bell
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at DigitalCommons@Liberty University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Liberty University. For more
information, please contact scholarlycommunication@liberty.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph S. Bell (2006) "Schiavo's Right to Refuse Food and Water: Ascendancy of the Artificial Natural Person," Liberty University Law
Review: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 10.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol2/iss1/10
COMMENT
SCHIAVO'S RIGHT TO REFUSE FOOD AND WATER:
ASCENDANCY OF THE ARTIFICIAL NATURAL PERSON
Joseph S. Belt
What is man, that thou art mindful of him? And the son of man,
that thou visitest him?
- King David, Psalm 8, verse 4.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defining personhood has always been difficult, but it has never lacked an
element of the ethereal. The term "person" comes to us from the Latin
"persona," meaning a mask, or one who wears a mask, as an actor would.' In
ordinary conversation, the term "person" most often refers to a human
individual, with no distinction between the mask and the actor. However, from
a legal perspective, a "person" is only the mask, a composite of "legal rights
and duties,"2 worn by some unknown and otherwise unimportant actor, to
represent a character in the story of legal history. With such an ambiguous
actor at its core, the law of personhood has evolved slowly and haphazardly into
a patchwork quilt of categories used to make pragmatic and sometimes
contradictory decisions about the mask and its actor, whether state, private, or
otherwise.3
Modem juridical blueprints for defining personhood fail to elucidate a
unified and stable theory of the person, resembling instead a disjointed
collection of design drawings for legal technicians. While such technicians
may be extraordinarily skilled interpreters of these legal schematics, they
typically cannot explain the engineering principles behind the original design.4
f Senior Staff, Liberty University Law Review, 2006-2007; J.D., 2007, Liberty University
School of Law; B.S. in Computer Science, 1987, North Central College; Diploma in
Bible/Theology, 1975, Moody Bible Institute.
1. Oxford Latin Dictionary 1356 (Combined ed. 1982).
2. JOHN CHipMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 27 (Peter Smith
Publisher, 2d ed. 1972) (1909).
3. See generally Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of
Constitutional Personhood. A Theory of Constitutional Personhoodfor Transgenic Humanoid
Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1431 (1992).
4. Roger Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247, 250 (1978).
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Occasionally, a case comes along that exposes how serious a weakness in that
understanding can be, particularly as it relates to proper identification of the
focal point of human law, the person.5 Legal technicians build their machine
according to the design specifications, and everything appears to be working
correctly. Yet the machine begins to produce results intuitively recognizable as
wrong, and everyone is puzzled. Just such a case has emerged from the bitter
struggle to control the destiny of a severely cognitively disabled Florida woman
named Theresa Marie Schiavo (Terri).
Schiavo6 is important because it challenges a key assumption of modem
right-to-die jurisprudence; that the working definition of legal personhood is
sufficiently coherent to justify the judicial imposition of a "prosthetic"
autonomy for the severely cognitively disabled.7 While some may argue that
the intensity of public attention to the Schiavo drama was fundamentally a
political event,8 this Comment contends that what transpired was instead a clash
between two equally religious theories concerning the nature of personhood.9
The collision of ideas flowed not out of politics per se, but out of profoundly
conflicting intuitions regarding the nature and destiny of humankind. The
public malaise during the proceedings, the intense and widespread legal debate
among both professional and amateur legal thinkers, and the imagery of police
turning away young children trying to help a fellow human being, all represent
a public recognition that there has been an elusive yet real breakdown of the
5. GRAY, supra note 2, at 7.
6. The cases discussed in this comment collectively referred to as Schiavo include: In re
The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
2000); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 2001); Schiavo exrel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.Supp.2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d
1223 (11 th Cir. 2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (1Ith Cir. 2005).
All references to Trial Transcripts are referring to transcripts of the probate trial designated as In
re The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. 2000). The Trial Transcripts were obtained by the author from Barbara J. Weller, attorney
for the Gibbs Law Firm, P.A., and are on file with the Liberty Law Review [hereinafter Trial
Transcripts].
7. GRAY, supra note 2, at 27 (suggesting that while a duty may bind in the absence of
volition, a right cannot be exercised without a corresponding volition). The term "prosthetic
autonomy" as used here, describes the attempt to reconstruct artificially the volition of a person
whose volitional powers are presently inaccessible, in a manner similar to the use of a physical
prosthesis to replace a missing limb.
8. See generally George J. Annas, "I Want To Live": Medicine Betrayed by Ideology in
the Political Debate Over Terri Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REV. 49 (2005).
9. See generally ROBERT GEORGE, CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND
MORALITY IN CRISIS (2001).
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machinery of the law. The legal profession is obliged to understand and fully
address that breakdown, yet it cannot do so without resort to those first
principles that underlie the legal machinery's original design.
Part II of this Comment explores those first principles by evaluating the
evolution of personhood in the areas of religion, philosophy, and contemporary
bioethical theory.'0 Part III traces the historical development of the competing
legal theories of personhood as courts confronted a growing and bewildering
array of definitional problems for borderline personhood.1 Part IV explores
how the Schiavo appellate courts used various elements of currently popular
personhood theory, both directly and intuitively, to arrive at their decision.
12
Part V evaluates the current state of personhood in the law and considers how
alternative understandings of personhood might have yielded a different
outcome in Schiavo."3 Part VI recommends that end of life jurisprudence
establish a system of three safeguards that would better account for the risk of
competing religious theories respecting personhood as a function of judicial
bias. First, establish a rebuttable presumption that the state is always an actor
in disputed end of life cases. Second, adopt civil habeas corpus protection for
the severely cognitively disabled in disputed end of life cases. Third, in the
interest of equal protection, develop uniform standards for a more scientific
approach to judicial determination of cognitive disability. 14 Part VII concludes
this Comment.15
II. EXTRA-LEGAL SOURCES OF PERSONHOOD THEORY
A. Religious Undercurrents
The search for the meaning of the personhood concept must begin with an
exploration of the sacred, for it is in the sacred that we find the earliest clues
that being human transcended a merely biological understanding of
personhood. 16 Many of the ancient major cultures at some point recognized
personhood as a quality possessed or a status achieved, whether by deity,
angels, humans, or other forms of sentient life.17 While the later philosophers
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part Ill.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. See infra Part VII.
16. Christian Smith, Human Personhood and Culture, in CHIuSTIAN SMITH, MORAL,
BELIEVING ANmALS 76-77 (2003).
17. Ernest Valea, Many Paths to One Goal? The Human Condition in World Religions,
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would attempt to forge a meaningful theory of the person from the pristine
building block of pure reason, they extracted the major themes of these theories
from the raw material of religious metaphysical history. We therefore
undertake a brief review of the major strands of religious thought that run
before the major philosophical advances in the theory of personhood, as they
will prove the words of King Solomon true, that "there is nothing new under
the sun."' 8
The monotheistic religions, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, have a
relatively similar understanding of personhood as expressed both in God and in
God's special project, humankind.' 9 Christianity adds the idea that personhood,
even for God, is always a function of a relation to the Other, as Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit are distinct persons in the Godhead who nevertheless exist in
relationship to each other.20 Thus, the Christian God, even as a unitary being,
provides the complete and ultimate paradigm of personality; He exhibits all the
attributes of the most exalted rationality and the most expansive consciousness,
while also expressing by analogy those person-like attributes that are
characteristic of personal relationships, such as joy, anger, language, and love.2
For such monotheists, humans made in the image of God have a unique
place in creation; unlike lesser creatures, they not only have attributes of deity
in their makeup, but by virtue of those attributes can engage in a special
relationship with God.22 This apparent hubris is the basis of some objections
raised by those who subscribe to a substance-independent notion of
consciousness as personhood. For example, Peter Singer accuses monotheists
of speciesism for singling out man as uniquely capable of personhood.
23
However, this begs the question of whether man is in fact in a unique
relationship with the Creator. If so, then recognition of the uniqueness of
2006, http://www.comparativereligion.com/man.html.
18. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
19. Jiirgen Moltmann, Reflections: The Change of Values in the Western World, Lecture at
Center of Theological Inquiry (Oct. 1997) (discussing the uniqueness of the Abrahamic
religions with respect to their similar approach to the exceptional dignity of the individual
human person), http://www.ctinquiry.org/publications/reflections-volume_1/moltmann.htm
20. See 1 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHIusTIAN RELIGION 153-54 (John Baillie, John
T. McNeill, & Henry P. Van Dusen eds. 1973) (1536) (In Book 1, Chapter 13, Section 25,
Calvin describes the Trinity as a unity of essence and a plurality of persons whose relational
roles give rise to their personal distinctness).
21. Valea, supra note 17.
22. See Genesis 1:26 ("And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness:
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the
cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.").
23. Johannes Sun Hsiao-chih, Are All Human Beings Persons?, LIFE UNIVERSITY,
http://210.60.194.100/life2000/professer/johannes/articles/8..Human%20Persons.htm.
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humankind's status is not hubris but mere situation: this is simply where we
find ourselves.
In Christianity, two major theories of personhood exist. 24 First, the monistic
approach posits that personhood only exists when there is a union of soul and
body.25 In this view, the soul is the life-force generally, as distinct from mere
consciousness. Therefore, personhood can be preserved where any degree of
human life can be sustained, with or without consciousness. The soul enlivens
the body and has no identity without it. As long as the body lives, the soul is
present. If the soul is present, there is personhood. Thus, any living human
must necessarily be a person as long as life remains.2 6
The other approach is traditional Christian dualism, which acknowledges
that the spirit can exist independently of corporeality.27 In this view, a person
may exist without a body, but is bound to the body as long as the body lives, on
the understanding that when, and only when, the body dies, the spirit returns to
the Creator. This is also sometimes referred to as substantive dualism, in that
the being that sustains continuous identity is of a real, if immaterial,
substance.28
Despite their differences, monotheistic monists and dualists alike would
agree that while the biologically human body lives, it possesses intrinsic,
categorical personhood, and therefore retains all the rights, if perhaps not all the
duties, of being a person.
In contrast to monotheism, pantheism teaches that everything is God, and
God is everything. 29 That is, the label "God" is a label appropriate to put on the
sum of all things. Therefore, if God is person, then everything is in some sense
person, or at least a partial person, a fragment of the whole. If God is the
supreme object of contemplation, the highest being, then identifying God as
person can just be another way of saying that God has maximum consciousness.
The human quest, under pantheism, is to raise one's consciousness to higher
levels, thus becoming one with the greater divine consciousness.30
However, Buddhist pantheism does not require that deity involves personal
consciousness per se, as the ontological limits implicit in relational persons
24. Fred Hutchison, Intellectual Decadence of Pro-Abortion Ideology, RENEW AMERICA,
2005, http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/hutchison/050123.
25. J.P. MORLAND & Sco1r B. RAE, BODY& SouL: HUMANNATURE &THE CRISIS IN ETHICS
20 (2000).
26. WOLFHART PANNENBERG, WHAT IS MAN? 47-48 (1970).
27. MORELAND & RAE, supra note 25 at 20.
28. Id.
29. Michael Levine, Pantheism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/pantheism.
30. Id.
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seem to conflict with the notion of a fundamentally universal being. Therefore,
the Buddha specifically rejected the notion of self.3' To oversimplify
somewhat, the person was really just the composite of the body (rupa), feeling
(vedana), cognition (sanna), volition (sankhara), and consciousness
(vinana).32 Thus, for Buddhist pantheism, the notion of person is illusory, and
the quest for Nirvana is the quest to shed the illusion of self.
33
Hinduism has a wide variety of forms and expressions, embracing ideas of
personhood that are in a sense dualistic, yet quite unlike western conceptions of
a spirit that can be closely identified with its corporeal manifestation.34 In a
hymn of the Rig Veda, the phrase "make me immortal" expresses succinctly the
notion of the persistent self.35 Yet the spiritual self is not the corporeal
36expression of self, for there is a barrier of illusion that the self must overcome.
Atheism, while resistive to classification as religion, has nevertheless
attempted various means of establishing metaphysical personhood as well. One
approach has been to identify the pervasive belief in substantive personhood as
a widespread fault in human logic:
In reality, personhood is a concept, an artificial category,
nonexistent in nature. Suggesting that a literal moment exists when
a cell attains personhood is like saying there's a detectable instant
when adults become senior citizens. The onset of "personhood"
can't be pinpointed or measured because the "event" doesn't
literally happen.37
The logic error, reification, is to assign corporeality to an abstraction without
justification, i.e., to make the idea of person into a real thing.38 Thus, for
atheism, because substantive personhood is false, all that remains is abstract
personhood, which is entirely the product of collective social reasoning.
31. MAHA THERA U THATrI, THE FUNDAMENTALPRINCIPLES OF THERAVADA BUDDHISM 83-
84 (Kenneth W. Morgan, ed., 1956).
32. EARL H. BREWSTER, THE LFE OF GOTAMA THE BUDDHA 66 (1926); Valea, supra note 17.
33. Valea, supra note 17.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. John Bice, Unjustifiable Use of Refication to Shape Viewpoints Too Prevalent, THE
STATE NEWS, 2005, http://www.statenews.com/oparticle.phtml?pk-28878.
38. Another example might be, "the law says thus and such." The law does not literally
speak; that is an attribute normally associated with persons qua persons. Yet so-called
reifications often are nothing more than effective shorthand for expressing very large, complex
ideas. It seems somewhat hasty to dismiss such ideas out of hand merely because their form of
expression does not conform to rather narrow rules of construction.
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Atheists frequently regard such ideas as social constructs that can be defined
arbitrarily and applied as needed.39
Christian and other religions have retained their theories of personhood in
parallel with developments in the philosophical domain. Each of these systems
has had to address the relationship between the visible and the invisible,
between body and spirit, between material and divine. In consequence of the
pervasive but unsystematic religious efforts to define divine and human identity
in the context of the sacred, the stage had been set for the emergence of
philosophers who would attempt to convert the art of recognizing persons into a
science.
B. Philosophical Underpinnings
One of the most pernicious problems in defining persons is that one must
contemplate the criteria for ascertaining personhood from within one's own pre-
existing belief system.40 That is, to arrive at the conclusion that someone is not
merely a something, one must first believe in persons.41 Despite this constraint,
theorists from all periods of philosophical history have not hesitated to put forth
various theories for determining membership in the personhood club. One
should note that each of these theories expresses a yet more fundamental and
pre-existing belief concerning the relationship between body and soul,
expressive of some form of religious or quasi-religious dualism or monism.
This is critical to apprehend, because it demonstrates that all beliefs about
personhood necessarily invoke metaphysical presuppositions that had their
origins in religious thought.42 As Alvin Plantinga said, in the context of
defining persons, "[h]ow we think about God, then, will have an immediate and
direct bearing on how we think about humankind. ' 43
One of the early Christian theorists in the field was Boethius, who proposed
that a person was an indivisible substance of a rational nature.44 That is, a
being was a person if it had individuated and possessed a rational nature.
Under this definition, such a being could have the "substance" of a rational
nature. That is, such an entity did not have to perform physically those
39. Bice, supra note 27.
40. Smith, supra note 16, at 48, 118-20.
41. Id. at 120.
42. RONALD DwoRKmN, LIFE'S DOMINIoN 164-65 (1993) (asserting that the core issues in the
debates over the sanctity of life are fundamentally religious).
43. Alvin Plantinga, Advice to Christian Philosophers (With a Special Preface for
Christian Thinkers from Different Disciplines), 1 FAITH AND PILOsOPHY 253, available at
http://www.faithandphilosophy.com/onlinearticle/advice.
44. MORELAND & RAE, supra note 25, at 25.
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properties that belonged to its non-material and inherently rational substance.
Furthermore, such a substance was capable of survival independent of any basis
in material substance.45
In the wake of the scientism that arose during the enlightenment period, a
hypothesis of immaterial substances came to be regarded as incoherent.46 The
empirical sciences demanded evidence of the immaterial, which, as a matter of
definition, could not provide material proof of its existence.
Into this newly created vacuum stepped the likes of John Locke and
Immanuel Kant. Locke defined a person as "a thinking intelligent being, that
has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking
thing in different times and places. ' 47 Thus, in Lockean personhood, it was
essential to have not only consciousness, but to have access to the memory of
preceding states of the conscious self. While this begins to forge a tighter
connection between body and mind, it also creates problems with retaining the
personhood of those who have lost the memory of who they were at some
previous time in their lives. Alzheimer patients would, under this definition,
become a new person with every new episode of contiguous self-memory, but
would temporarily cease to be persons during the lapse between.
Kant described a person as a being with rational autonomy.48 For Kant,
rationality implied a freedom to choose. Although the outer world could not be
experienced directly, the rational mind was free to interact with the inner
representation of those things presented to it.49 Such a mind was also under a
duty to act as a free moral agent, selecting or rejecting the choices available
through the medium of the inner experience.50 Thus, Kant's dualism
envisioned the personal self as a metaphysical entity subsisting in rationality as
expressed by the only law that that rationality could access, the law within.
Hence, autonomy ("self-law") became the pivotal defining attribute of the
Kantian person.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 18, 88-90.
47. J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 335 (Oxford University
Press, 1979) (1690) (at bk. II, ch. XXVII, § 9).
48. IMMANUEL KANT, INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, KANT'S CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 279 (Thomas Kingsmill
trans., 4th ed. 1889) (1785).
49. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 155-56 (F. Max Muller trans., 2nd ed.
1896) (1787) (describing the outer world as "completely beyond the sphere of our knowledge");
KANT, METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, supra note 48 at 268-69 (stating that an ethical duty is a strictly
internal legislative force).
50. KANT, METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, supra note 48 at 268-69.
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John Stuart Mill represents the utilitarian approach to personhood. In
general, utilitarian praxis is to identify what action or combination of actions
will produce the greatest amount of happiness and pursue that. Thus, for Mill,
a person's dignity was proportional to his or her capacity for experiencing pain
or pleasure, because that is how to measure the success or failure of the pursuit
of happiness.51 In such a system, any being capable of experiencing pain and
recoiling from it, or pleasure and the desire of it, constitutes a protectable
person. Oddly, modem incarnations of this position reduce persons to mere
pain detectors. We can all identify with pain, after all. However, the mere fact
that an experience is shared does not, in itself, impose a moral template on that
experience. It is simply shared. To go from "pleasure is shared" to "pleasure is
good" requires a leap into the metaphysical.
C. Modern Bioethical Theory
The current bioethical paradigm is a patchwork quilt of the foregoing
descriptions of personhood developed by Locke, Kant, and Mill.52 This is
somewhat alarming, because this confused composite picture of personhood is
the engine of bioethical theory-making that informs and drives the legislative
and judicial processes. This might be acceptable if the underlying principles
were essentially coherent. However, incompleteness and deep internal conflict
plague each of the major constituent philosophic constructs.53 Considered
separately or in combination, these principles fail to answer definitively which
of the competing dualisms correctly identifies a person.
The "Georgetown mantra" of bioethics principles is the current embodiment
of essential bioethical thought.14  The central principles are respect for
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. 55 The formulators of
these principles freely "acknowledge that they cannot ground these principles
on a particular theory of ethics, but appeal instead to 'common morality.' 56
Under this regime, the "correct" dualism is between the physicality of the body
and the abstraction of self, such that to be a self is precisely equal to having a
51. JoHN STUARTMILL, UTILrrARIANISM 19-20 (Prometheus Books, 1987) (1861).
52. Dianne N. Irving, Academic Fraudand Conceptual Transfer, in BIOETHICS: ABORTION,
HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH AND PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH 193-215 (Joseph W. Koterski ed.,
1995), available at http://www.all.org/abac/dni008.htm.
53. Id.
54. Ronald Bailey, Uncommon Morality: Can Bioethics Bring Us All Together?
REASONONLINE, 2002, http://www.reason.com/news/show/34795.html.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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certain kind of consciousness, and, then, only as long as one has that
consciousness, or at least the "developed capacity" for it.
The Georgetown mantra's notion of the mind as a non-substantive
abstraction independent of the body is an artifact of rationalism.5 7 The more
primitive criteria of capacity for pain and pleasure are a function of the sensory
self, and can be traced to empiricism and Mill's utilitarianism.58 The supposed
pragmatic value of using these attributes, aside from the universal referents of
pain and pleasure, is their apparent independence from the traditional Christian
dualism of body and spirit. This is critical to their acceptance in a postmodern
and therefore pluralistic society, because the quest of postmodem polity is to
avoid at all costs the imposition of sectarian theories in solving public
problems.59
1. Person-Category or Person-Function?
Yet each of these criteria has sectarian troubles of its own. All definitions of
personhood require the application of metaphysical criteria, but how should one
apply that criteria? Should one apply them categorically, as traits typical of the
species, or functionally, as descriptions of discrete individuals? 60 If categorical
application of the criteria is rejected in favor of evaluating specific individuals
in terms of function or ability, to what degree must these criteria manifest
themselves in the individual to warrant classifying that individual as a person?
Will mere potentiality be sufficient, or must there be, as asserted by M.A.
Warren, a developed capacity for the given function?61 Where a capacity is
long from being mature, or has fallen into permanent disuse, through injury or
disease, such a being can make no claim to functional personhood. Peter
Singer, in arguing for animal rights, has presented the problem of entity
valuation based on developed capacity in stark terms:
I have argued that the life of a fetus is of no greater value than the
life of a non-human animal at a similar level of rationality, self-
consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel, etc., and that since no
fetus is a person, no fetus has the same claim to life as a person.
Now it must be admitted that these arguments apply to the newbom
57. Irving, supra note 52.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. JOHN P. LizzA, PERSONS, HUMANITY, AND THE DEFINTION OF DEATH 40-41 (2006).
61. Mary A. Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status ofAbortion, in BIOMEDICAL ETHIcS
434-40 (T.A. Mappes & D. DeGrazia eds., 4th ed. 1996), available at http://instruct.west
valley.edu/lafave/warrenarticle.html.
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baby as much as to the fetus. A week old baby is not a rational and
self-conscious being, and there are many non-human animals whose
rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel, and so
on, exceed that of a human baby a week, a month, or even a year
old. If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a person, it
appears that the newborn baby does not either, and the life of a
newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a
chimpanzee.62
In addition to developed capacity, Warren has also proposed that a person is
one who belongs to the moral community.63 To belong to this club, one must
be both a moral subject and a moral object. One must make moral judgments,
and be an object over which other moral subjects are obliged to make moral
judgments. The challenge here is circularity. Ascertaining what is moral is
essential to finding personhood, yet those already defined as persons must make
the morality by which the moral community is defined, which in turn defines
personhood. "Unless the measuring rod is independent of the things measured,
we can do no measuring." 64
Thus, if the life of Mr. Singer's otherwise healthy fetus, who will, by natural
and timely biological progression, acquire as actual all the requisite capacity to
join the moral club of personhood, is in such peril, then what of the severely
disabled? Surely, those whom society deems permanently excommunicated
from the society of human persons through severe disability will be seen as
even less valuable under such a measuring stick. Worse still, some individuals
may possess the consciousness necessary to receive and contemplate the
activities of the moral community, yet may be trapped inside a body that can
give no intelligible communication to the outer world that such moral thoughts
are present.65 Does the notion of participation in the moral community always
demand a perception by the moral community that the individual is
participating? That would seem to confer, on a majoritarian basis, the power to
create personhood ex nihilo, based solely on potentially flawed perception
inhering in the moral community.
As a more modest alternative, encoded or potential capacity purports to offer
a way to implement the functionalist approach to personhood without
62. Peter Singer, Taking Life: Abortion, in PRACTICAL ETHICS 122-23 (1980).
63. ON THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ABORTION, supra note 61.
64. C.S. LEwis, The Poison of Subjectivism, in C.S. LEWIS, CHRISTIAN REFLECTIONS 73
(Walter Hooper ed. 1967).
65. Keith Andrews et al, Misdiagnosis of the Vegetative State: Retrospective Study In A
Rehabilitation Unit, BRITISH MED. J. 313, 313-16 (1996), available at http://bmj.bmjjoumals
.com/cgi/content/full/313/7048/13.
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endangering some classes of humans who lack, or appear to lack, the requisite
66Althtin
attributes of persons. All that is necessary to survive is to have a primary
capacity to develop a secondary capacity that is implicit in one's DNA. The
secondary capacity can be for consciousness, or pain, or a desire for survival,
but it does not have to be anything more than incipient. This initially appears to
resolve the problem of continuity. A person can be recognized as capable now
of becoming capable of other, more person-like things later.
However, such a scheme begs the question of how any criteria could be
chosen that would not be subject to the charge of being arbitrary.67 For any
given characteristic, determining that a capability existed in a specific
individual's DNA would be a prerequisite to ascertaining that individual's
personhood. Furthermore, the degree to which a given candidate for
personhood possesses a given attribute could be determinative of their
personhood, hence of their survival. In some arbitrarily distant future, what
level of IQ would be considered person-like? What level of desire for self-
continuation must our candidate to personhood possess? How would one
measure such a desire for survival? Who would do the measuring?
An additional problem of encoded capacity is that it does not address those
who once were competent but have lost, or appear to have lost, the requisite
capacities to participate in the moral community.6 8 Their DNA, like Singer's
fetus, reflects the presence of the physical apparatus necessary to think, plan,
hope, and so forth. Perhaps in some arbitrarily advanced future, the mere
presence of such genetic information will bring with it a presumption of
potential cure. If that sophisticated future arrives, would a definition of
personhood based on potential capacity, that nevertheless excludes some
damaged humans based solely on our present society's incapacity to repair
biological damage, be viewed as barbarically underinclusive?
2. The Functional Criteria
Once it has been decided how the criteria will be applied, it becomes
necessary to resolve exactly what those criteria shall be, and how they shall be
measured. The most basic criterion of human personhood is human biology.
Using a genome to identify a human seems a relatively straightforward way to
ascertain the proper category of a given organism. 69 Nevertheless, biology
66. Hsiao-chih, supra note 23.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The author recognizes that there are numerous discussions regarding whether
nonhuman entities may properly be regarded as persons. However, the scope of this comment is
narrower, as we seek only to identify the proper range of human persons. For a discussion of
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alone leaves a number of unaddressed questions. A human corpse is clearly
biologically human, yet it is doubtful any serious participant in the personhood
debate would regard it as a person. This is so because, according to common
social understanding, only a living human organism is a person. However, this
is problematic, because, for modem bioethics, the definition of a living human
hinges more on neurological life than on a general life in the body.7°
Therefore, for a functionalist, a living, genomically human being does not
automatically qualify as a person. Only a living, genomically human being that
71
can sustain consciousness may remain in the competition to become a person.
Consciousness, however, is sufficiently amorphous that it tends to frustrate
efforts at objective measurement. For example, if a persons-as-functions purist
asserts consciousness as an unqualified necessity ofpersonhood, the persons-as-
category theorist can respond with the sleep question.72 If a human being is
asleep, and not dreaming, is the human still a person? If not, would ending the
physical life of this human during sleep constitute murder? If not, why not?
The answer must be that this human is so nearly able to experience
consciousness as to be construed a person, based on the speed with which he
can rise to person-like consciousness. Therefore, even functional absolutism
must retreat to the position of latent as opposed to actual capability.73
Assuming now that our candidate for personhood is living, genetically
human, and psychologically aware, it is still not a person unless it can
demonstrate moral autonomy. Autonomy ranks as perhaps the highest attribute
in the modem theory of personhood. Autonomy is, roughly speaking, the
ability to participate in the moral community as a moral choice-maker. Any
lesser living being may make choices, such as what food to eat, what physical
comforts to seek, and so forth. However, in the Kantian pattern, autonomy is
only realized when the self ascends to making moral choices.74 If autonomy
were considered quantitatively, the more capacity one has for making moral
choices, the more one is a person. Conversely, to the extent one's choices are
limited by the choices of others or other forces, the less one is a person. If one
has no autonomy, then even with consciousness, one does not deserve the
respect reserved for persons. This mode of thinking has profound implications
Artificial Intelligences as persons, see Lawrence B. Solum, Essay, Legal Personhood For
Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1231 (1992).
70. LiZzA, supra note 60, at 33.
71. Id.
72. Hsiao-chih, supra note 23.
73. Id.
74. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr, The Many Faces OfAutonomy, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYsis
283-97 (2001).
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for the severely cognitively disabled, for bioethics committees of the not-too-
distant future may use this logic to treat severe dementia, that which precludes
rational moral choice, as a death state, a state of conscious non-personhood.
That specter of personhood by committee haunts the modem quest to find a
satisfactory jurisprudence of personhood. However, as in physical science,
juridical experiments that attempt to build on faulty theoretic premises tend to
eventually demonstrate the defects of the theory. Until the Copernican
revolution, even the wisest of persons in Europe once believed that so-called
epicycles were a valid explanation for the movement of the planets. However,
when it became clear through careful study that the sun was the center of the
solar system, the need for the tortuous twists and turns of epicycles dissipated.
Similarly, law is the laboratory of theories respecting persons. As the modem
bioethical theory of persons has unfolded in the practice of law, many
weaknesses in the theory have been revealed.
III. MODERN PERSONHOOD JURISPRUDENCE
A. Roe Gives Birth to Cruzan
Law has typically made a distinction between natural and artificial persons.75
Natural persons, as Blackstone puts it, are persons such as the "God of nature
formed us." 76 Presumably, he refers not only to our material makeup, but, as he
speaks from within the context of a traditional Christian narrative, he includes
our spiritual makeup as well. He contrasts this composite entity issuing from
deity with the human-made entity of the artificial person.77 Such a person
exists only because man is its creator. Man confers on it those rights and duties
it sees fit to impose.
That was then. For the modem living human being that fails to qualify as a
legal person, there are consequences. Declaration of someone's personhood "is
usually 'meant to emphasize the individual's normative standing, implying that
treatment of her as a mere thing is inappropriate." 7 8 Thus, acquiring, or failing
to acquire the label of "person" is not merely descriptive, but has a
corresponding normative effect, sending a critical signal to the legal system as
75. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *123 ("Persons also are divided by the law
into either natural persons, or artificial. Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed
us: artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and
government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.").
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Hsiao-chih, supra note 23.
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to how the relevant entity should be treated. 79 For those least able to speak
authentically on their own behalf, "mongoloids, psychotics, the autistic, the
senile, the profoundly retarded," not to mention the very young and the very
old, a message of non-personhood can have deadly effect, as exampled in the
case law that follows.80
In the march of autonomy from religious and philosophical theory to center
stage in American jurisprudence, Roe v. Wade marks a critical juncture and the
modem starting point for the development of Right-to-Die case law.8' Roe
promoted the right to privacy, an incipient form of autonomy, from a narrowly
applicable ground for common law battery to the status of a pervasive
constitutional given.8 2 In 1973, Roe challenged Texas criminal abortion laws as
unconstitutional.8 3  The Supreme Court held that the laws were an
unconstitutional violation of Griswold's recently discovered right to privacy,84
and that such a decision belonged exclusively to the would-be mother during
the first trimester, as guided by the medical judgment of her doctor.8 While
the Roe court did grant states limited power to impose control over a pregnancy
during the second and third trimesters, 6 the reign of autonomy through privacy
in the area of personal medical choices had begun in earnest, and would
become the cornerstone of a significantly expanded right to refuse medical
treatment in many cases to follow.
Building on Roe, the landmark decision In re Quinlan justified a life-
87terminating decision based on privacy. In 1975, at age 22, Ms. Quinlan
suffered an apparent loss of oxygen to her brain and, due to the resulting brain
injury, entered a condition diagnosed as a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS).88
Her father sought to become her guardian in order to terminate artificial
respiration, in the belief she would die naturally.89 The court held that Ms.
Quinlan retained a right to privacy, even while in a PVS, such that she also
retained a right of autonomous decision to refuse medical treatment, which her
79. Id.
80. S. RUDMAN, CONCEPTS OF PERSON AND CHRISTIAN ETIucs 57 (1997).
81. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
82. Id. at 153.
83. Id. at 122.
84. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
85. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
86. Id. at 163-64.
87. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
88. Id. at 653-55. For a discussion of some of the difficult problems in defining PVS, see
Giacino & Whyte, The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: Current Knowledge and
Remaining Questions, 20 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHABIL. 30, 32-33 (2005).
89. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651.
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guardian could exercise on her behalf.90 Dismissive of concerns for adverse
impact on medical standards and practices, the Quinlan court held that, if the
guardian and the family were agreeable, and the physicians unable to offer any
hope of recovery, cessation of life support could occur with no civil or criminal
liability to any participant.9' Therefore, Ms. Quinlan was taken off the
respirator in 1976. However, because she spontaneously began breathing on
her own, she did not die until she succumbed to pneumonia in 1985.92
The line of cases that evolved from Quinlan struggled with the question of
how best to determine the end of life wishes of a person diagnosed as
permanently cognitively incapacitated. 93 Two basic approaches evolved. One
approach used a hypothetically objective "best interests" model, which courts
would apply only when they did not know the patient's end of life wishes at all.
Under this model, the statutorily designated decision-maker contemplated what
a reasonable person would do in similar circumstances. 94 The other approach
used a subjective "substituted judgment" test, under which the court
adjudicated the patient's wishes based on available evidence, and the
designated decision-maker simply carried out those wishes.95
During this period of legal evolution, some courts used a strictly interpreted
version of "clear and convincing" evidence that excluded casual hearsay except
as a supplement to more documentary forms of proof.96 These courts appear to
90. Id. at 663.
91. Id. at670.
92. Robert Hanley, Quinlan Funeral Is A Quiet Farewell, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1985.
93. For a more detailed treatment of right to die case law, see Susan Adler Channick, The
Myth of Autonomy at the End-of-Life: Questioning the Paradigm of Rights, 44 VILL. L. REV.
577 (1999).
94. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977) (holding that a severely retarded person with a terminal disease could refuse life-
prolonging treatment because, even though he had never been able to form an intent regarding
his own death, the court found that his wish would be reasonably evident, to the court at least, if
he had had the capacity to realize his circumstances).
95. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (holding that an 84-year-old incompetent
nursing home patient being fed through a nasogastric feeding tube has the right to refuse
medical treatment through a surrogate decision maker, providing certain safeguards are
observed. Removal of a feeding tube with consent is not suicide, because a feeding tube is a
medical treatment subject to refusal.). See also Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a patient diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state
with no hope of cognitive restoration had a common law constitutional right of privacy to
remove a feeding tube, despite an apparent gap in the controlling Florida statutes respecting
feeding tubes).
96. In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 72 N.Y.2d 517 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that oral
evidence of wish to die was not "clear and convincing," because it did not show "a firm and
settled commitment, while competent," to refuse the feeding tube under "circumstances like
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have been more concerned that the patient had demonstrated an unequivocal
commitment to devalue their continued physical existence under specific
neurological circumstances. Other courts found evidence "clear and
convincing" even when the surrogate decision-maker could only guess at the
patient's probable end of life desires based on personal knowledge of the
patient's personal value system. 97 These courts have been more willing to
submit to the opinion of third party experts in determining the quality of life
basis for ending a life-sustaining treatment.
Then, in 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke for the first time on the right
of an incapacitated patient to refuse artificial means of delivering water and
nutrition.98 In 1983, Nancy Cruzan was injured in an automobile accident in
which her brain was seriously damaged through lack of oxygen. 99 When her
guardians sought a declaratoryjudgment that would permit them to remove her
feeding tube, the Probate Court of Jasper County, Missouri, approved the
action.' 00 The state appealed and the Missouri Supreme Court reversed.'0'
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court openly considered the quality of life
principle that inhabited the thinking of the trial court. 10 2 The Court decided that
Missouri had the constitutional prerogative to assign an intrinsic value to
human life, wholly apart from functional qualifications, and therefore to require
the higher evidentiary standard of "clear and convincing" evidence, capable of
demonstrating unequivocally the competent wishes of a presently incompetent
patient. 0 3 The Court also held that due process was not violated when the
Missouri Supreme Court found that the guardian's substituted judgment fell
short of "clear and convincing" when there was a lack of substantial proof that
such judgment represented the true exercise of Ms. Cruzan's volition.' 4
Nevertheless, on remand, the trial court found that the evidence of Nancy's
desire to die did rise to "clear and convincing" after all, permitting the removal
of her feeding tube.10 5
those presented." Id. at 522).
97. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (holding that woman diagnosed as being in
an irreversibly vegetative state could exercise her right to refuse feeding tube through a
surrogate, if the prognosis could be verified by two neurological experts.).
98. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990).
99. Id. at 261.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 262.
103. Id. at 261.
104. Id. at 263.
105. Cruzan v. Mouton, Estate No., CV 384-9P (Mo. Cir. Ct.1990).
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That same year, the Florida Supreme Court built on the foundation of
Cruzan in deciding Browning.1°6 In 1985, Estelle Browning executed a written
declaration providing that upon her hopeless incapacitation, her caretakers
should abandon all life-prolonging procedures. 10 7 The following year she
experienced a stroke. Her doctors diagnosed her as being in a Persistent
Vegetative State (PVS), and inserted a feeding tube to keep her alive.' 08 The
Browning court found that, while a written declaration created a rebuttable
presumption of "clear and convincing" evidence, oral evidence did not enjoy
the same presumption, and the petitioner was required to meet that burden of
proof using the subjective "substituted judgment" test.'0 9 Nevertheless,
accepting that the burden had been met with oral evidence, the court affirmed
the decision of the lower court to permit the removal of the feeding tube despite
the statutory requirement of imminent death, citing the Florida constitution's
commitment to the right of privacy.'
0
Thus the law that developed from Roe to Cruzan created a context where
actions that once were legally indistinguishable from euthanasia or suicide
came to be accepted under the aegis of autonomy (expressed as the right to
privacy) and the corollary right to refuse medical treatment."' During this
period the question moved from whether adjudicated self-destruction was
morally right, to whether society could be sure it had afforded its cognitively
incapacitated citizens a process that fully protected their personal medical
autonomy. 12 That approach, crystallized into statutory form in Florida, was the
backdrop against which the Schiavo controversy would unfold.
B. Statutory Substitutes for Personal Autonomy.
Exemplars of state heath care advance directive statutory schemes rooted in
modem bioethical theory are abundant, and Florida, both at the time of the
Schiavo litigation and at the present, is no exception.1 3 Wrapped around the
106. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 16.
110. Id at 9-12.
111. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294-95 (1990) (Scalia J.,
concurring) (depicting the criminality of suicide in early common law).
112. Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 380-82 (Cal. 1993). See also Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (defining one's self is at the heart of liberty).
113. See generally FLA.STAT. ANN. § 765.101 et. seq (West 2007). Note: The HCAD was
enacted shortly after a Florida Supreme Court decision in which the Court outlined a
methodology for adjudicating end of life decisions, requesting the Florida Legislature to
implement the methodology in six months. The HCAD is a direct response to that request. See
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core case law principles of autonomy coupled with the right to choose or refuse
any medical treatment, Florida's Heath Care Advance Directive (HCAD)
provides a comprehensive framework for determining both the consent and the
medical condition of an incapacitated person."1
4
The HCAD provides that a patient who does not expressly plan for eventual
incapacity be entitled to a substitute medical decision-maker styled as a
proxy. 115 The proxy is to act with "informed consent" in determining whether
to subject an incapacitated person to a "life prolonging procedure. ' 16 The life-
prolonging procedure most suspect is that tending to result in only a "precarious
and burdensome existence,"1 17 which has obvious reference to a quality of life
perspective, a key descriptor of the functional theory of personhood.
Under the HCAD, competent individuals can use a living will to establish a
rebuttable presumption of clear and convincing evidence as to end of life
wishes. 1 8 When a person becomes incompetent, the designated medical
decision-maker cannot act to withdraw life-prolonging procedures unless the
patient is unlikely to regain capacity, or has a terminal or end-stage condition,
or is in a PVS." 9 The HCAD, following the classic lines of criteria for
functional personhood, defines PVS as a permanent and irreversible condition
of unconsciousness marked by a lack of voluntary action or cognitive behavior
of any kind, coupled with an inability to communicate or interact purposefully
with the environment. 1
20
This incorporation of functional personhood directly into the statutory
language permits bioethical practitioners to view PVS-categorized patients as,
philosophically speaking, already dead. That such a strong connection can exist
between one's operating concept of personhood and one's approach to the
death of the cognitively disabled is evidenced in the language used in the
British case of Tony Bland:
The doctors can lawfully discontinue all treatment including
ventilation, nutrition, hydration and other medical treatment because
there is no possibility of him ever emerging from his existing PVS.
In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990).
114. FLA.STAT. ANN. § 765.101 (West 2007).
115. Id. at 765.101(15); Id. at 765.401.
116. Id. at 765.101 (10) (defining a life-prolonging procedure as "any medical procedure,
treatment, or intervention, including artificially provided sustenance and hydration, which
sustains, restores, or supplants a spontaneous vital function," excluding palliative care).
117. Id. at765.102.
118. Id. at765.302.
119. Id. at765.304.
120. Id. at 765.101(12).
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* . . He has no feeling, no awareness, nor can he experience
anything relating to his surroundings. To his parents and family he
is "dead." His spirit has left him and all that remains is the shell of
his body.'21
Notice also the distinctly religious flavor of the judge's statement. The judge
has clearly stated a particular theory of personhood, that loss of higher brain
function equates with the departure of the human spirit, that even a living
human being, if he no longer possesses the requisite functionality, must lose his
place among legal persons.
Nevertheless, to sustain the illusion of autonomy, the Florida HCAD and
statutory schemes like it provide that one of several classes of persons may act
as a proxy decision-maker for the patient.12 2 Proxies, in order of availability,
can be the judicially appointed guardian, a spouse, adult children, a parent,
adult siblings, a close adult relative, a close adult friend, or a licensed clinical
social worker.1 23  The health provider's bioethics committee, or another
bioethics committee if necessary, has the power to choose the proxy., 24 The
proxy can apply "substituted judgment" where evidence of patient wishes is
available, or may use a "best interests" approach in the absence of such
evidence. 125 In either case, clear and convincing evidence must support the
proxy's decision. 1
26
In the event the decision of a proxy or surrogate has the potential to affect
directly any interested parties, the decision is subject to judicial review.1 27 The
grounds for a review may include such things as ambiguity of the advance
directive, true extent of the patient's capacity, change of the patient's mind, or
questions respecting the loyalty, due diligence, and appropriateness of the
surrogate or proxy.128
As a defense against potential abuse of the fine line between the various
manners of ending the life of incapacitated persons, the statute explicitly denies
the validity of any interpretation sanctioning mercy killing, euthanasia, or
suicide.
29
121. Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789, 804 (U.K.).
122. FLA .STAT. ANN. § 765.401 (West 2007).
123. Id. at 765.401(1).
124. Id. at 765.401(l)(h).
125. Id. at 765.401(3).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 765.105.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 765.309.
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In the event of a dispute, the power to act as proxy passes to the court.' 30
This is what happened in Schiavo. The court was then bound to apply the same
evaluative sequence as the non-judicial proxy, searching first for clear and
convincing evidence of Terri's subjective medical treatment prognostications,
then looking to a best interests solution in the absence of sufficient evidence of
intent.
C. Do the Autonomy Substitutes Work?
There is a growing consensus that both the current bioethical framework and
the statutory schemes founded on it are failures. 3 1 Failure here is defined in
terms of objectives. If a project has spent its best energy, and the objectives
remain unmet, it has failed. For many, this failure has taken the form of
entering the medical system optimistic that our shared cultural icon of
autonomy would be honored, only to find that in practice, conflicting theories
of the meaning of autonomy held by the various actors produce unexpected and
undesirable results.132 Arguably, the reason for its failure runs deeper than
simply confused philosophical DNA. The essential problem of modern
bioethics is that in exalting autonomy to the supreme good, it has embarked on
the postmodern journey into the deconstruction of the repository of that
supposed good - the human self 1
33
Thus, at one level, the personhood question looks like a matter of not only
getting into but also staying in the club. However, Terri's problem was not that
she was not in the club, because, by extending to her the power of precedent (or
artificial, or prosthetic) autonomy, she was, at least hypothetically, still in the
club. Yet, when a judge allows quality of life factors to enter surreptitiously
into the judicial opinion formation process, the judge has made the inherently
religious decision that personhood is quantifiable, and that protection of the life
interest rises or falls with one's functionality. Thus, by extending to Terri a
right to refuse treatment, when she in fact had no power render a real, current
moral choice, the trial court was in effect seeking evidence from her past that
under the right circumstances, she would be willing to consent to treatment as a
non-person, in an act of "precedent autonomy."'
134
130. Id. at 765.105.
131. Daniel Callahan, Bioethics: Private Choice and Common Good, HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT, 28-31 (1994)
132. Channick, supra note 93, at 584.
133. Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing the Hippocratic Oath, 65 U. COLO.
L. REv. 77, 115-16 (1993).
134. DwORKIN, supra note 42, at 226. For a rebuttal of the notion that autonomy is
vindicated through choices made far in advance of the actual circumstances, see R. Dresser,
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IV. THE PERSON OF TERRI SCHIAVO ON TRIAL
A. The Probate Trial of2000
Early on the morning of February 25, 1990, Tern collapsed in her home.
The exact cause of her collapse remains obscure, but the resulting oxygen
deprivation severely injured her brain. 135 On June 18, 1990, Pinellas County
Probate Court Judge Robert F. Michael appointed Terri's husband, Michael
Schiavo, to be her plenary guardian. 136 Terri's parents, the Schindlers, were not
present at this hearing, and have since stated that neither Michael nor the court
ever informed them of the proceedings, despite being in daily contact with
Michael during that period. 137 In 1992, Michael brought a medical malpractice
suit against Terri's physicians, alleging that they had negligently failed to
diagnose her for bulimia. 138 Michael received a settlement award of about
$686,700 for loss of consortium, and Terri received about $1,563,300 into a
trust fund for her ongoing medical needs. 139 Up to this point, the relationship
between the Schindler family and Michael was amicable and cooperative. 140
However, not long after winning the malpractice suit, Michael changed his
approach toward the treatment of his wife. In early 1994, Michael gave Terri's
caregivers a "do not resuscitate" order, in the event she experienced cardiac
arrest while under their care. 141 An employee of the facility challenged the
action, and Michael rescinded the order. 142 Immediately thereafter, Michael
transferred Terri to the Palm Gardens of Largo Nursing Home. 143 On May 11,
1998, Michael petitioned the Pinellas County Probate Court for authority to
discontinue use of the feeding tube, but because the Schindlers challenged the
Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy, in BIoETn!cs: AN ANTHoLOGY 312
(Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, eds. 2000).
135. Report of Autopsy, Schiavo, Theresa, Case No. 5050439, at 9. At least two major
theories have been proposed to explain this event. One suggests that Terri was bulimic and
collapsed as a result of heart failure induced by a potassium imbalance originating in the
bulimia. See DIANE LYNNE, TERRI'S STORY 43-46 (2005). The other theory is that Michael
Schiavo choked or otherwise injured his wife, resulting in the oxygen deprivation. See id. at 53-
55. The aforementioned autopsy report appears to be neutral with respect to both theories.
136. LYNNE, supra note 135, at 81.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 66.
139. Id. at 70.
140. Guardian ad litem report to the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Probate Division at 5,
In Re Theresa Marie Schiavo, An Incapacitated Person (December 29, 1998).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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action, Michael, as Terri's proxy under Florida's HCAD statute, sought judicial
intervention.' 44
On January 24, 2000, the probate court considered the petition to remove
Terri's feeding tube.145 The testimony focused on what would become the two
major questions controlling the remaining litigation: First, to what degree
could the court be medically certain that Terri was in a Persistent Vegetative
State (PVS) with no reasonable hope of recovery? 146  Second, was there
sufficient evidence from her past that, if she became irreversibly incapacitated,
she would consent to die by means of the withdrawal of food and water?
147
Dr. James Barnhill, M.D., an open advocate of euthanasia, addressed the
question of Terri's medical condition by testifying for Michael that she was
indeed in a persistent vegetative state.148 To get at the question of consent, each
side presented testimony attempting to reconstruct the probable wishes of Terri
regarding end of life decisions through remembered conversations. 149 The
probate court accepted the testimony of three witnesses, Michael Schiavo, Scott
Schiavo, and Joan Schiavo.150 The three family members testified uniformly
that Terri had expressed a desire that her future caregivers not keep her alive in
144. See In re The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL
34546715, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000). The probate trial is a response to FLA. STAT. ANN. §
765.105 (providing for judicial intervention where end of life decisions by a proxy are
challenged by interested parties).
145. In re The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL 34546715,
at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
146. Andrew McCarthy, Spare Me The Indignation: So Now the Scientific Evidence is
Suddenly Important? NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.corr/
mccarthy/mccarthy200506 17 13 2 .asp.
147. Id.
148. LYNNE, supra note 135, at 136. Unfortunately, due to the pro bono nature of the
Schindlers' legal effort at that time, they were unable to bring in an expert of their own to
counter Dr. Barnhill, and therefore stipulated that Terri was in a PVS. See LYNNE, supra note
135, at 134.
149. See generally Trial Transcripts: testimony of Michael, Joan and Scott Schiavo, Mary
Schindler, and Diane Meyer.
150. It is unclear how the probate court was able to justify accepting the testimony of
Michael Schiavo, or why the Schindlers failed to raise an objection to that testimony, because at
the time of trial the Florida Dead Man Statute governing hearsay for agents of incapacitated
persons prohibited testimony from guardians with an interest in the litigation. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.602(1) (repealed 2005) as of February 2000, reads, in pertinent part: "No person interested
in an action or proceeding against ... the assignee, committee, or guardian of a mentally
incompetent person, shall be examined as a witness regarding any oral communication between
the interested person and the person who is ... mentally incompetent at the time of the
examination."
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circumstances like those of Karen Ann Quinlan.151 The probate court rejected
the testimony of two other witnesses, Mary Schindler and Diane Meyer, who
testified to Terri's expression of exactly opposite inclinations in conversations
with Terri about Karen Ann Quinlan in the early 1980s. 152 The probate court
dismissed that testimony as unreliable, in part because it placed those
conversations in the late 1970s rather than the early 1980s, apparently based on
the assumption that Karen Ann Quinlan died shortly after her caregivers
removed her respirator in 1976.153 This would have placed Terri's desire-to-
live statements in her early adolescence and her alleged desire-to-die statements
in her more mature early adulthood. In fact, Ms. Quinlan died of pneumonia in
1985, meaning that the remembered conversations with Diane Meyer in the
1980s were at least plausible. The probate court would later admit that its
assumption was in error, but would let the judgment stand nonetheless, due to
its reliance on other factors.
154
On February 11, 2000, the probate court issued its opinion that the evidence
was sufficient under the "clear and convincing" standard to show that Terri was
in a PVS and that she had, while competent, expressed to Michael and other
151. See Trial Transcripts: Michael Schiavo's testimony at page 22, line 25 through page 23,
line 11; page 29, line 19 through page 33, line 14; Scott Schiavo's testimony generally; Joan
Schiavo's testimony generally.
152. See In re The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL
34546715 at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000). (The probate court asserts that Quinlan died six years
before 1982. That is 1976, the year the respirator was removed, not the year Quinlan died.); For
the testimony affirming Terri's will to live, see Trial Transcripts: Mary Schindler at page 371,
line 25 through page 374, line 23; page 409, line 18 through page 415, line 24; Diane Meyer at
page 766, line 24 through page 769, line 12; page 775, line 4 through page 787, line 7.
153. See In re The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL
34546715 at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
154. See trial court order issued March 9, 2005, In re The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie
Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000) (The court here dismisses the
impact of the Quinlan death date error because the discounted testimony was supposedly
focused on the time of Quinlan's respirator disconnection, not the time of her death. However,
this ignores the fact that the court itself explicitly used the errant time of death for Quinlan as a
primary basis for demoting Meyer from a credible to a non-credible witness. Furthermore, the
trial court's distinction between what Terri wanted for Quinlan and what she would want for
herself seems contrived at best. It assumes a bifurcation in Terri's moral reasoning for which
there is no evidence. Indeed, Christians are classically taught to desire for others what they
would desire for themselves. This is a direct teaching of Jesus and is primordial to the Christian
faith. See Matthew 7:12. Logically, then, the burden would be on the court to show that this
was not true in Terri's case, yet it appears blissfully unaware that this question of fact exists at
all).
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Schiavo relatives that she would prefer to die if hopelessly incapacitated.
1 55
However, weeks later, the probate court issued a stay against the order to
remove the feeding tube to permit an appeal by the Schindlers to the Florida
2nd District Court of Appeals. 56 Over the next five years, the litigants would
continue their struggle through numerous further appeals, an attempt at
intervention by both the Florida Legislative and Executive branches, and a
decision of the Florida Supreme court that the attempted legislative intervention
violated Florida's constitutional separation of powers. 57 During that period,
Terri's feeding tube would be removed two more times, with the final removal
order being given by the probate court on February 25, 2005, mandating that
Terri's feeding tube would be removed on March 18, 2005.158
B. The Congressional Intervention
In response, on March 8, 2005, Senator Mel Martinez and Congressman
Dave Weldon proposed a bill that would effectively act as the civil equivalent
of the federal habeas corpus statute. 159 Crafted on the premise that innocent
persons who are about to die at the hands of the state should receive no less
process than guilty persons, the bill would have federalized the presumption of
keeping feeding tubes in severely incapacitated patients where explicit end of
life directives were missing.1 60 This early version of the bill also would have
155. In re The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL 34546715,
at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
156. See generally In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 2001).
The stay was ordered by Judge George Greer on March 24, 2000. See Order On Petitioner's
Emergency Petition For: ... Extension of Time of Stay, In re The Guardianship Of Theresa
Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
157. Kathy L. Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Key Events in the Case of Theresa Marie
Schiavo, UNIVERSrIY OF MIAMI ETHICS PROGRAMS, 10-25-2006, http://www6.miami.edu/
ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm.
158. Id.
159. Senator Mel Martinez (R-Fla.) introduced S. 159, 109th Cong. (2005); a bill identical to
the one that Congressman Dave Weldon (R-Fla.) introduced in the house. H.R. 1151, 109th
Cong. (2005). The legislation is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2005).
160. H.R. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005) which was designed to "amend title 28, United States
Code, to provide the protections of habeas corpus for certain incapacitated individuals whose
life is in jeopardy, and for other purposes.'" H.R. 1151 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Extension of habeas protections to certain persons subject to court orders. (a) For
the purposes of this chapter, an incapacitated person shall be deemed to be in
custody under sentence of a court established by Congress, or deemed to be in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court, as the case may be, when an
order of such a court authorizes or directs the withholding or withdrawal of food
or fluids or medical treatment necessary to sustain the person's life. In a habeas
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reclassified all incapacitated persons as being in state custody if they were
subject to orders removing life support, a critical feature for not only the habeas
action, but also in terms of a possible DeShaney exception, infra.16 1
Incapacitated persons so classified would be entitled to deploy the full range of
habeas corpus strategies after exhausting state remedies. 62 However, the
generally applicable version of the bill failed to gain the unanimous support it
needed during the consensus-building phase, in part because Congressman
Sensenbrenner was uncomfortable with implementing such a dramatic
expansion of scope for the federal habeas corpus rule.1
63
Congressman Sensenbrenner countered with a version of the bill that did not
use the habeas corpus approach. 64 This bill was instead narrowly focused on
corpus proceeding under this section the person having custody shall be deemed to
encompass those parties authorized or directed by the court order to withdraw or
withhold food, fluids, or medical treatment, and there shall be no requirement to
produce at the hearing the body of the incapacitated person. (b) Subsection (a)
does not apply in the case of ajudicial proceeding in which no party disputes, and
the court finds, that the incapacitated person, while having capacity, had executed
a written advance directive valid under applicable law that clearly authorized the
withholding or withdrawal of food or fluids or medical treatment in the applicable
circumstances. (c) As used in this section, the term "incapacitated person" means
an individual who is presently incapable of making relevant decisions concerning
the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of food, fluids or medical treatment
under applicable state law. (d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to create
substantive rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States or of the several States.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Telephone interview with then Schindler attorney Barbara Weller, December 2005.
Transcript on File with the Liberty University Law Review. Congressman Sensenbrenner is a
Republican House of Representative member from the State of Wisconsin.
164. H.R. 1332, 109th Cong. (2005) which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Protection of rights of incapacitated persons (a) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this chapter, not later than 30 days after available State remedies have
been exhausted, an incapacitated person, or the next friend of an incapacitated
person, may remove any claim or cause of action described in subsection (b) to the
United States district court for the district in which the claim or cause of action
arose, or was heard. (b) The claim or cause of action referred to in subsection (a) is
one in which the State court authorizes or directs the withholding or withdrawal of
food or fluids or medical treatment necessary to sustain the incapacitated person's
life, but does not include a claim or cause of action in which no party disputes,
and the court finds, that the incapacitated person, while having capacity, had
executed a written advance directive valid under applicable law that clearly
authorized the withholding or withdrawal of food or fluids or medical treatment in
the applicable circumstances. (c) In hearing and determining a claim or cause of
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providing a federal appeal to incapacitated persons who, by virtue of a state
court decision, were to stop receiving nutrition and hydration.165 To ensure a
fresh look at the evidence, the bill explicitly required a de novo review of state
court evidence and disallowed issue or claim preclusion.
1 66
Nevertheless, while Congress struggled to find a workable legislative
compromise, Terri's caregivers removed her feeding tube for the third and final
time on March 18, 2005.167 When the final form of the Congressional Act
emerged, it provided standing only to the Schindler family for a federal appeal
of their constitutional claims on behalf of Terri.16  The bill, "An Act for the
relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo," passed both houses. The
President signed the act into law by early on March 21 169
C. The Federal Hearings
On March 22, making swift use of the Congressional Act, the Schindlers
brought constitutional claims to the District Court for the Middle District of
Florida. 7 0 The District Court reviewed the claims under the standard criteria
for granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), finding that, while the
action removed under this section, the court shall only consider whether
authorizing or directing the withholding or withdrawal of food or fluids or medical
treatment necessary to sustain the incapacitated person's life constitutes a
deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. (d) The United States district court shall determine de
novo any claim or cause of action considered under subsection (c), and no bar or
limitation based on abstention, res judicata, collateral estoppel, procedural default,
or any other doctrine of issue or claim preclusion shall apply. (e) As used in this
section-(l) the term "incapacitated person" means a born individual who is
presently incapable of making relevant decisions concerning the provision,
withholding, or withdrawal of food, fluids or medical treatment under applicable
law; and (2) the term "next friend" means an individual who has some significant
relationship with the real party in interest, and includes a parent.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Cerminara & Goodman, supra note 157.
168. An Act For the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119
Stat. 15 (2005) (The act provides, in pertinent part, that the "United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida shall have jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on a
suit or claim by or on behalf of Theresa Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of
Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the United States relating to the
withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain life.").
169. Cerminara & Goodman, supra note 157.
170. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.Supp.2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
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balance of the equities fell in favor of the Schindlers, their potential for success
on the merits was insufficient to warrant a TRO. 17
1
The first claim was that Terri did not receive a fair and impartial trial as
required by procedural due process, asserting that the trial judge could not
successfully be both a surrogate commissioned to implement her end of life
wishes and a neutral judicial arbiter of those wishes. 172  Despite the
philosophical tension between the judge's two roles, this claim failed because
the HCAD statute, taken together with Browning, apparently does provide a
Florida judge with power to act as both judicial fact-finder and proxy decision-
maker in resolving end of life disputes.173 Another Florida guardianship law,
which prohibits a judge from being a guardian except for the judge's personal
relations, apparently has no practical effect on the HCAD's judicial
intervention rule. 174 Arguably, the better course would have been to observe
both statutes in the area where they overlap. This would likely result in the
designation of a neutral third party proxy decision-maker, relieving the judge of
a potentially untenable role conflict.
The second claim, that Terri did not have adequate legal representation,
failed because the court found that Terri's three sporadically available
guardians ad litem, taken together with the extensive litigation history and the
skill of Schindlers' current attorneys, satisfied due process.175 However, it is
fair to ask whether the more recent crew of attorneys, regardless of their skill,
had any real hope of overcoming the legal momentum established during the
probate trial, especially after the debilitating twin blows of not being able to
bring expert medical witnesses and failing to object to interested hearsay
evidence. 1
76
The third claim, that Terri had been denied her right to equal protection by
having a single judge determine both her wishes and her destiny, failed because
the court found it was not a violation of equal protection to apply different sets
171. Id. at 1388.
172. Id. at 1385.
173. Id. at 1386.
174. FLA. STAT. ANN. 744.309(l)(b) says, in pertinent part: "No judge shall act as guardian
after this law becomes effective, except when he or she is related to the ward by blood, marriage,
or adoption, or has maintained a close relationship with the ward or the ward's family, and
serves without compensation." However, there apparently is no rule directly governing the
relationship between FSA 744.309 and the judicial intervention provision of the HCAD. The
fact that the Schiavo court assumed the conflicting roles without rebuke from the Florida court
system suggests at least one set of circumstances exist where such a role conflict will be
tolerated, despite the notable lack of legislative consideration.
175. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1385-87 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
176. LYNNE, supra note 135, at 136. See also supra note 157 and accompanying text.
220 [Vol. 2:193
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 220 2007-2008
2007] SCHIA VO'S RIGHT TO REFUSE FOOD AND WATER 221
of rules to the competent and the incompetent with respect to determining their
end of life wishes.
177
The fourth claim, that the court had violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 178 by forcing her to act against her faith
by removing her feeding tube, failed for the lack of a cognizable state actor.
79
Similarly, the fifth claim, that her caregivers had violated her religious freedom
by forcing her to remove her feeding tube contrary to a decree of the Pope, also
failed for the lack of a cognizable state actor.' 80
The court here fails to recognize that it is the decree of the Pope asserting the
"ordinary care" status of feeding tubes that precipitates a conflict between
Terri's religious template and the state's religious template. During the probate
trial, Father Gerard Murphy testified that he thought the Catholic Church's
view on feeding tubes was that they were extraordinary care, and a good
Catholic could refuse them without committing sin.' 81 The Pope's declaration,
made in 2004, countermanded this, making feeding tubes "ordinary care," and
making their removal a sin, tantamount to suicide.' 82 Therefore, under current
Free Exercise jurisprudence, the probate judge could not continue to press for
removal of the tube after such a declaration, unless the removal was known to
be free of religious coercion. 183 However, despite the fact that Terri's true,
contemporaneous wishes were unknown, wishes that might have altered under
the new command of the Pope, the probate court forced the legal persona of
Terri, in the name of her own autonomy, to perform a profoundly sinful act.
This crass violation of the natural Terri's presumptive religious template, in
177. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1387 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
179. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1387 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
180. Id.
181. In re The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated, 2000 WL 34546715
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000); Trial Transcripts: Father Gerard Murphy's testimony at page 191, line 7 to
page 191, line 20.
182. John Paul II, Address of John Paul II to the Participants in the International Congress
on Life-Sustaining Treatments And Vegetative State: Scientific Advances And Ethical
Dilemmas, address delivered in Rome at the Augustinianum University (March 20, 2004),
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/john_paul-ii/speeches/2004/march/documents/
hfjp-iispe_20040320_congress-fiamcen.html. See also Bishop Robert C. Morlino, Medical
Treatment: Make Decisions Based on Catholic Teaching, http://www.catholicculture.org/
library/view.cfin?recnum=-6443 ("To intend suicide should one ever be found to be diagnosed as
permanently unconscious is gravely immoral").
183. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (observing that the government may not
engage in activity that coerces compliance with any particular religion).
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order to enforce the state's express religious template, was nothing less than
stated-sponsored religious coercion of the most extreme kind.
84
Nevertheless, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed because, like the
District Court, it was unable to believe that the Schindlers' claims had a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
185
Undaunted by their initial failure, the Schindlers crafted five additional
constitutional claims for the district court to consider.' 86 The sixth claim stated
that Michael and the hospice violated Terri's right to therapy and rehabilitation
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).8 7 That claim failed because
the district court did not view Michael or the hospice as state actors. 88 The
seventh claim was that the hospice had discriminated against Terri and violated
her right to rehabilitation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.189 That claim
failed because, although Terri was indeed handicapped, and the hospice did
receive federal funds, the hospice was not withholding food and water because
of her disability, but solely because of the court order and the instructions of the
guardian.' 90 This conclusion appears to conflict with the conclusion in the
preceding claim. If the hospice was acting primarily under compulsion of the
184. It is true there was conflicting testimony regarding the relative strength of Terri's
commitment to the rituals of Catholicism. However, there is a substantial gap between poor
church attendance habits and the willful commission of self-murder. Evidence at trial did not
demonstrate this extraordinary degree of rejection of Church teaching in Terri's thinking, and
unrefuted evidence was given of the opposite, that she respected the teachings of her church.
See generally Trial Transcripts.
185. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
186. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
188. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1164-65 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) defines a public accommodation as: "a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank,
barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of
an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care
provider, hospital, or other service establishment;" The hospice might have qualified, ejusdem
generis, as a public accommodation under the "other service establishment" term of the statute.
189. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161,1165 (M.D. Fla. 2005). See
also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
190. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1166 (M.D. Fla. 2005). The
court also found that Terri was not "otherwise qualified" to receive rehabilitative services. Id.
An "otherwise qualified" disabled person impliedly has two disabilities, one of which must be
overcome to seek treatment for the other. Where the disability to be treated and the disability
barring treatment are the same disability, the individual is not "otherwise qualified." This
appears to mean that under the Rehabilitation Act, a person must have at least two independent
deficiencies, one to be rehabilitated and the other to be overcome to receive rehabilitation for
the first. Under this definition Terri was not "otherwise qualified." See also United States v.
Univ. Hosp. of State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984).
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state, this would imply it was a state actor. If it was not acting primarily under
compulsion of the state, that would imply an act of discrimination cognizable
under the Rehabilitation Act. The court does not address this apparent
contradiction.
The eighth claim stated that Terri had been denied her procedural due
process right to a substituted judgment based on the implied "clear and
convincing" evidentiary standard of Cruzan.191 That claim failed because the
district court interpreted Cruzan as not creating any federal evidentiary standard
for end of life decision-making, so that only a state court could evaluate
whether consent to die met its own interpretation of the "clear and convincing"
standard. 192 It was in this claim that the Schindlers attempted to raise the
evidentiary errors of the probate court respecting Karen Ann Quinlan's time of
death. 193 However, owing to the perceived lack of a federal benchmark for
clear and convincing evidence respecting the will to die, the court bowed to
comity and deferred to the state probate court's findings without further
review. 1
94
The ninth claim, that Terri's death by starvation and dehydration would
violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, failed because the proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment applies only to those convicted of a crime, and because, once again,
191. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1166 (M.D. Fla. 2005);
Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
192. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1166-67 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
Florida's HCAD statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(3) reads, in pertinent part: "a proxy's
decision to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence that the decision would have been the one the patient would have chosen
had the patient been competent." Deferring this evidentiary evaluation to the state, however,
appears to beg the question of whether it was proper under a purported de novo review to defer
to the probate court's application the "clear and convincing" standard of review, as opposed to
using state law to reexamine the record for compliance with that standard. To terminate the
analysis by relying on the state court finding nothing wrong with its own conclusions respecting
the standard of review appears to undercut the very question a de novo review of any kind is
designed to address. For some lively discussion of these theories and more, see the following
blogs: http://legalxxx.blogspot.com, and http://patterico.com.
193. Id. at 1166-67. For a more detailed discussion of the probate court's factual error, see
supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
194. Id. It should be noted in passing that this was precisely the point at which the
Congressional Act's de novo review language was aimed. However, because the final language
of the Act appeared to make the use of the de novo standard optional, the district court
sidestepped an opportunity to explore Terri's medical condition and end of life desires directly.
If the probate court were correct, of course, there would be no need to dig deeper, because Terri
was already philosophically dead.
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there were no state actors. 195 The court does not address the question of pain,
perhaps because it has accepted at face value the legal conclusion of the probate
court that Terri was in a PVS, and therefore by definition unable to experience
pain. 196  However, the evidence that Terri could experience no pain is
disturbingly inconclusive at best.1 97
The Schindlers' tenth claim was that depriving Terri of food and water
against her wish to live violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process right to life.' 98 Asserting that substantive due process can protect one
against "government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them," the district court nevertheless retreated once again to the
position that because there was no cognizable state actor, the analysis could not
reach Terri's substantive due process right to life. 199 This insulated the district
court from having to confront the right to life claim as a new claim not
addressed in state court. Such an inquiry would have brooked no deference to
the evidence already adduced at the probate trial, but instead would have
invoked a full federal rehearing of the two essential themes of that trial: Terri's
true medical condition and Terri's will to live or die.200
The court also stated that, assuming arguendo there had been a state actor,
the government could still take a person's life if the government has provided
that person with sufficient procedural due process.20 1 That is of course true in
the criminal context.20 2 However, the court does not support its assertion that a
civil taking of life is anywhere contemplated in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather, the court first uses a criminal case to discuss the independence of
substantive due process rights from state procedural due process, and then
oddly applies Scalia's concurrence in Cruzan to show that even substantive due
process rights, including life, can be curtailed if due process is provided. It is a
questionable use of Scalia's language because ironically, Scalia was asserting
195. Id.
196. Whether authentically PVS patients experience pain is not an altogether resolved
question. See LYNNE, supra note 135, at 126.
197. Id. at 157.
198. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1167-68 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
199. Id. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,195
(1989) ("[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the state to protect
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.").
200. Michael C. Dorf, How the Schiavo Federal Court Case Might Have Been Won,
FINDLAW LEGAL NEWS AND COMMENTARY (2005), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.
com/dorf/20050326.html.
201. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1168 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
202. RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROcESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIoN 32-33 (2004).
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that the state may curtail Nancy Cruzan's due process right to liberty by
compelling her to receive a feeding tube, so that Missouri's interest in life
would be able to trump her individual interest in liberty.20 3 Contrary to Scalia's
notion of curtailed liberty interest, the district court here appears to be making
the remarkable decision that the Fourteenth Amendment allows the state to
defeat the life interest of an innocent citizen, even if it provides a lesser
procedural safeguard than the reasonable doubt standard used in capital
criminal procedure.
On March 25, 2005, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's rejection of the Schindlers' constitutional claims, analyzing the various
claims in essentially the same manner as the district court.204 In another appeal,
on March 30, Judge Tjoflat in his dissent examined the more general role of
due process in the tenth Schindler claim, the right to life.20 5 He identified this
claim as plausible because Cruzan and other cases probably do imply by
analogy that a minimum federal benchmark of "clear and convincing" evidence
exists for end of life adjudication.20 6 The analogy rests in finding a positive
federal requirement for "clear and convincing" evidence where lesser interests
than human life are at stake in a civil context, such as the termination of
parental rights, or improperly conducted civil commitment proceedings, even
though those latter two rights impinge directly on autonomy.0 7 It is regrettable
that the court ignored Judge Tjoflat's assessment of Cruzan. Giving credence
to the existence of a federal due process right to a minimum standard of clear
and convincing evidence might have lifted the raw data of the case out from
under the heavy layers of state findings and forced a fresh look at Terri's
medical condition and her alleged will to live.20 8
Judge Tjoflat offered further evidence suggesting the existence of such a
minimum standard by analogizing to federal habeas jurisprudence. 20 9 For
example, the Supreme Court has found it necessary on occasion to prevent a
hurried execution from occurring before the state court could adequately
203. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990).
204. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
205. Id. at 1279-82.
206. Id. at 1279. ("The clear and convincing standard of proof has been variously defined in
this context as 'proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and
settled commitment to the termination of life supports under the circumstances like those
presented."' Id. (citing Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990)).
207. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (reviewing the termination ofparental rights);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (reviewing an improper civil commitment).
208. This is a strategy proposed by Dorf. See Dorf, supra note 200.
209. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1279 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
225
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address the merits. 2 1 Moreover, the mere claim of a state that it had applied
the appropriate standard appropriately did not prevent the Supreme Court from
challenging whether "any rational trier of fact," independent of the state
context, could have arrived at the same conclusion. 1 It would be difficult to
comprehend these generalizations apart from the presence of an implied federal
standard. 212 The fact that an undue or self-created sense of urgency pushes a
court to think and act with haste does not protect it from the heightened risk of
error or the mistakes in fact made under such circumstances.213 Judge Tjoflat
was convinced that "the District Court should make this determination only
after a full and careful review of the evidence, which cannot occur under
current time constraints." 21
4
On March 3 1, thirteen days after her feeding tube was removed, Terri
died.215
V. WILL THE REAL TERRI PLEASE ACT?
A. Is the State a Mirror or an Actor?
It is likely that the confused jurisprudence of personhood demonstrated
during the Schiavo struggle reflects the unsettled and diverse thinking of the
American people themselves in this area. After all, the state is itself an artificial
person, created by the people to act on behalf of their collective will, their
collective autonomy, as it were.216 Yet, as the people of this country are
religiously diverse, so their individual presences inside the machinery of the
law have led to a multiplicity of religious expressions disguised as level-headed
judicial pronouncements. 217 The state then becomes a multi-headed hydra, here
210. Loncharv. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996).
211. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
212. It is unlikely that the federal court in Jackson would support an independent review of a
state decision under the "reasonable doubt" standard if that standard were not valid at the federal
level for that kind of case. See also Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284
(1990), in which it appears that the Cruzan court, if presented with the question directly, might
well have required clear and convincing evidence.
213. A false sense of urgency is a widely recognized cause of human error in decision-
making. See generally R. B. WirrTrNGHAM, THE BLAME MACHINE: WHY HuMAN ERROR CAUSES
ACCIDENTS (2003). For example, see Substandard Justice, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Apr. 25,
2001, House Editorial (attributing death of nine Japanese civilians to Navy officer's false sense
of urgency which in turn caused significant procedural human error).
214. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1280 n.3 (11 th Cir. 2005).
215. Cerminara & Goodman, supra note 157.
216. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. 229, 231 (1850).
217. Scott C. Idleman, Essay, The Concealment Of Religious Values In Judicial
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using Christian theories of the embodied soul, there using Kantian dualism's
supreme moral chooser, to decide for incompetents what they would do if they
were competent. The state provides, as it were, a prosthesis to the person's
damaged autonomy, by detecting precedent intent to surrender to some life-
threatening condition and by carrying out that intent. However, if the means of
detection is flawed, skewed by concealed, perhaps unconscious, judicial
religious inclinations, the resulting acts of "autonomy" have little hope of
representing the true wishes of the disabled person.218 If the prosthesis is an ill
fit, the maker of the prosthesis must own up to it.
Legislatures create laws in response to underlying conditions that are
producing unjust effects in a society. The Fourteenth Amendment is no
exception, and it recognizes a state actor to a purpose. The racial prejudice that
created slavery and caused the Civil War was rooted in a specific theory of
personhood, that because blacks were allegedly functionally inferior to whites,
they merited treatment as non-persons. The Fourteenth Amendment is
therefore targeted at precisely those kinds of state action that revolve around
such degenerative theories of personhood. There is no more principled use of
that law than to defend private persons from state-supported theories of
diminished personhood, regardless of how ubiquitous or unintentional those
theories may be.219
Yet most of the Schindlers' claims, relying as they did on a theme of due
process, could not succeed on the merits because the district court insisted there
was no state actor.220 One kind of state actor is the private actor who is not
performing his own will but the will of the state.221 The primary candidates for
this kind of state actor in the Schiavo calculus were Michael Schiavo and the
Woodside hospice. However, government officials may also be a source of
state action.222 Such government officials can include judicial officers. 223 It is
Decisionmaking, 91 VA. L. REV. 515, 517 (2005).
218. Id. at 528.
219. Shelly v Kraemer, 344 U.S. 11 (1948) (addressing the question of whether the judicial
enforcement of an otherwise private agreement violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the court
found that ajudge, merely by using his judicial office to enforce a racially discriminatory private
agreement, was indeed a state actor in the sense proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
220. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNST.
amend. XIV. Courts have construed this to mean that "[o]nly a state actor can violate the 14th
Amendment." See, e.g., Edwards v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 371 F.Supp.2d 859, 866 (W.D. Ky.
2005).
221. 15 AM. JuR. 2D Civil Rights § 72 (2007).
222. Id.
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true that a judge typically enjoys a near-absolute personal immunity from
liability, as his or her task is primarily to serve as a neutral arbiter among
litigants.224 Nevertheless, under some limited circumstances, even judges may
perform, as a matter of law, affirmative acts of the state. 25
The district court's principal defense against finding a state actor was
DeShaney v. Winnebago.2 6  DeShaney outlined an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment that divided state action from private action, and
further subdivided state action into categories of active versus passive (or
positive versus negative).227 Under DeShaney, if the state is passive in allowing
a private actor to harm another private actor, the injured party has no due
process claim against the state.228 Therefore, according to the district court,
because Michael Schiavo was a private litigant seeking his own ends, he was
not a state actor.229 The court did not deem the hospice to be a state actor
because, although it received some federal money, it was a privately operated
facility.230 Furthermore, because the probate judge was allegedly acting
passively by doing no more than adjudicating a dispute between two litigants,
no state action was detected.231
The policy argument for the austere compartmentalization issuing from the
DeShaney decision, although wrong, is initially compelling.232  If the
government were liable for all harm incurred through its inaction, this would
add an untenable cost to the operation of government.233 Furthermore, it would
234foster an undue and unsustainable dependence on government.
223. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 625 (1991).
224. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); See also Bottone v. Lindsley, 170
F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948) (ruling that a state court judgment must be a complete nullity to
invoke fourteenth amendment civil rights claims).
225. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). ("Without the direct
and indispensable participation of the judge, who beyond all question is a state actor, the
peremptory challenge system would serve no purpose. By enforcing a discriminatory
peremptory challenge, the court 'has not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has
elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination."' Id.).
226. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
227. Id. at 200.
228. Id. at 195 ("[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the state
to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors").
229. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1167 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
230. Id. at 1165.
231. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1388 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
232. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (noting the pervasive and long-standing
judicial fear that the Fourteenth Amendment, construed as imposing on the state an affirmative
duty to prevent the injury of its citizens, represented a potential "font of tort" litigation.).
233. See generally Toby J. Stem, Federal Judges And Fearing The "Floodgates Of
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Thinking itself shielded by the general principle of DeShaney, the district
court hastily dismissed the idea that the action of the probate court constituted
state action.235 If the probate court were truly acting only as the passive conduit
of private volition, then it would be difficult indeed to make out the judge to be
a state actor for purposes of the due process claim.236 Yet this notion of the
court's role as a passive mirror of the winning litigant's will is not the view
expressed by the Florida Court of Appeals:
The trial court's decision does not give Mrs. Schiavo's legal
guardian the option of leaving the life-prolonging procedures in
place. No matter who her guardian is, the guardian is required to
obey the court order because the court, and not the guardian, has
determined the decision that Mrs. Schiavo herself would make.237
Thus, an odd situation presents itself. If private actor Michael Schiavo is not
the one whose private will is to be carried out, who remains? 238 If the court is
simply a mirror for the winning litigant, whose face is in the mirror? If one
takes precedent autonomy as a valid concept, and if one accepts as valid the
findings of the probate court, then the only private actor still standing who
Litigation," 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377 (2003) (arguing that the fear of opening floodgates of
litigation, when used as a pragmatic defense against arriving at an otherwise valid legal
conclusion, unjustifiably puts an Article III court off its intended Constitutional course).
234. Nevertheless, some have argued that DeShaney oversimplified the historical analysis of
the Fourteenth Amendment by omitting state liability for state crimes of omission, leaving open
the possibility of a future course correction. See John R. Howard, Rearguing DeShaney, 18
T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 381 (2001).
235. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1388 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
236. Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133-34 (11 th Cir. 1992). (cited by the district court
to prove that "[u]se of the courts by private parties does not constitute an act under color of state
law."). However, the same page of the case also states that "a county probate judge clearly is a
state actor." See id. at 1133. Therefore, the district court appears to have oversimplified the
implication of Harvey by treating the role of the judge and the action of the judge as a single
unit. However, the test of state action in Harvey is a differentiated composite of the actor and
the action; taking the judge to be a state actor is perfectly valid. Whether the judge's actions
merit rebuke under the Fourteenth Amendment is a separate question that relates more to the
nature of the action itself.
237. In re Guardianship of Theresa Marie Schiavo et al., No. 2D05-968, 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005).
238. The final order of the Schiavo probate court reads, in pertinent part: "ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED that absent a stay from the appellate courts, the guardian, MICHAEL SCHIAVO,
shall cause the removal of nutrition and hydration from the ward, THERESA SCHIAVO, at
1:00 p.m. on Friday, March 18, 2005." Trial court order to remove nutrition and hydration,
issued on March 18, 2005, In re The Guardianship Of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Incapacitated,
2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
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could have caused the action against the life of Terri is Terri herself. However,
if the probate court erred in determining her true wishes, in implementing her
true autonomy, in divining her true religion, then the private actor in the mirror
is even less than a legal fiction, but a mere mask created by the state. Behind
that mask one will find the face, not of Terri Schiavo, but of the probate
judge.239
The district court never explored the forgoing questions, but instead sought
the shelter ofjudicial immunity, citing Harvey v. Harvey, a case that explicitly
affirms, without contradiction, that a "county probate judge clearly is a state
actor., 240 The district court also cites Torres v. First State Bank of Sierra
County,241 which states that only the most egregious and deliberate acts of
unconstitutional deprivation are actionable under title 42, section 1983 of the
United States Code.242 However, as a Tenth Circuit decision, Torres is not a
controlling authority in the Eleventh Circuit. Additionally, even if Tones did
provide individual judges with a defense against a section 1983 action, it does
not follow that the state at large is immune from a suit in equity when a state
court action is unconstitutional.243
Therefore, the district court's best defense remains DeShaney. However,
cases following DeShaney have recognized two exceptions that involve a
special relationship between the state and a private person; the "custodial
relationship" doctrine and the "state-created danger" doctrine.24
A custodial relationship exists when an individual's liberty is so
compromised by some overbearing presence of the government that she loses
the ability to take care of herself.245 Under Florida's HCAD statute, Terri
239. For commentary on the issue, see John Nicholas Suhr, Jr., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department Of Health: A Clear And Convincing Call For Comprehensive Legislation To
Protect Incompetent Patients'Rights, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1477 (1991).
240. Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127 (11 th Cir. 1992). The statement of the Harvey court
that "use of the courts by private parties does not constitute an act under color of state law" does
not contradict but rather informs its assertion of the inverse corollary that a probate judge clearly
is a state actor. Id. at 1133.
241. Torres v. First State Bank of Sierra County, 588 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1978).
242. Id. at 1326-27 ("We do not think that the 'color of law' reference in § 1983 was
intended to encompass a case such as this one, where the only infirmities are the excesses of the
court order itself,... subject to the normal processes of appeal.").
243. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
244. Niziol v. Pasco County Dist. Sch. Bd., 240 F.Supp.2d 1194 (M.D. Fla. 2002). The
Supreme Court has also recognized that conduct which "shocks the conscience" in a
constitutional sense may in some circumstances be sufficient to establish a basis for a
substantive due process deprivation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128
(1992).
245. White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1257 (1 lth Cir. 1999). ("[I]t appears that the only
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became entirely dependent on the state by law when the probate judge became
246the arbiter between the still competent disputing non-judicial actors.
Therefore, it does not require a significant leap of the imagination to see the
close working relationship of Michael Schiavo, the probate court judge, and the
Pinellas County police officers standing guard over Terri at the hospice, as a
form of state custody analogous to or perhaps more pronounced than the foster
care envisaged by DeShaney.
247
DeShaney also recognizes a state-created danger. A state-created danger
exists when the state, through its agents, has so entangled itself in controlling
the well-being of an individual that a failure to aid that individual is tantamount
to a positive injury.248 Thus, the state, by limiting the freedom of an individual,
assumes a duty of care to protect that individual from the dangers created by
those limitations. 249 In the Eleventh Circuit, an individual enters a state-created
danger when "the state affirmatively place[s] him in a position of danger which
[i]s distinguishable from that of the general public. 25°  A guardianship
relationship with a state court judge who can allegedly ascertain a person's will
to die and then can unilaterally issue an order mandating that person's death is
the paradigmatic fulfillment of the above test.
251
However, the state actor typically must also show culpable behavior with
respect to the danger, such behavior as shocks the conscience or demonstrates
indifference.252 It is reasonable to suppose that a judicial decision to make an
essentially religious decision for an incompetent subject would shock the
relationships that automatically give rise to a governmental duty to protect individuals from
harm by third parties under the substantive due process clause are custodial relationships, such
as those which arise from the incarceration of prisoners or other forms of involuntary
confinement through which the government deprives individuals of their liberty and thus of their
ability to take care of themselves.").
246. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.105.
247. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
248. Sanders v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2001). See also
Culberson v. Doan, 125 F. Supp. 2d 252, 270 (S.D. Ohio 2000) ("If Plaintiffs' facts are viewed
in a favorable light, it is also reasonable to conclude that, because Chief Payton had 'complete
control' of the potential crime scene, he also had 'constructive and functional' possession,
control or custody of Carrie's body. By potentially abandoning that control, custody or
possession to her murderer and the Baker Family, we conclude that Chief Payton's actions may
have violated Plaintiffs' substantive due process.").
249. Id. at 200.
250. Mitchell v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 107 F.3d 837, 839 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
251. IvAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE AND LocAL GovERNmENT
CvIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1: 17.
252. Id.
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conscience, especially when that decision flies in the face of the subject's
known religion.
B. Religious Autonomy and the Afterlife
If, as has been proposed in this Comment, the decision concerning what
constitutes a life worth living is a function of one's view of personhood, and if
one's view of personhood is inextricably intertwined with one's cosmology,• ' .. . .. i 253
i.e., one's religion, then any such decision is inherently religious. Therefore,
for any agent of the state, using a religiously premised notion ofpersonhood, to
impose death on an incompetent individual incapable of communication or self-
defense, is acting in a way that both shocks the conscience and demonstrates
extreme indifference. This is particularly true when one's conscience is
informed, at least in part, by the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the
U.S. Constitution.254 In the words of Justice Kennedy:
The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise
of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed
by the Establishment Clause. It is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which "establishes a [state] religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so."
2 55
Some have argued, and rightly so, that not all religious influence on state
action is inconsistent with modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence.256
Nevertheless, under Lemon, there are limits beyond which the state may not
go.257 The state must have a secular purpose for the rules that it generates, and
those rules must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.258 in
determining the purportedly probable autonomous choice of a living human
being as to whether to live on under difficult circumstances or to refuse life-
253. DwoRK , supra note 42, at 164-65.
254. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which reads in pertinent part,
"[c]ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
255. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
678 (1984)).
256. See generally Scott C. Idleman, Article, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments,
And The Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 1 (2002).
257. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
258. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (stating that for any given law, the
primary purpose must be secular and the primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit
religion).
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sustaining medical treatment, at least two secular purposes can be offered.
First, the social burden of compelling an otherwise healthy family unit to care
for an incompetent indefinitely deprives society of the family vitality that would
naturally ensue from the speedy demise of a disabled human being who is
already being treated as dead.25 9 Second, the economic burden of long-term
care for such an individual drains both personal and public resources to
excess.
26 0
However, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where there could be a more
severe entanglement with religion than to have a state actor rendering life-
ending decisions based on his personal understanding of the relationship
between body and soul. If coercion can be found for lesser things, such as
state-sponsored exposure to Christian music or Biblical texts or sectarian
prayers at football games, surely coercion can be found where helpless
incompetents are forced to accept death sentences, only for lack of thinking to
tell someone what they really believe about the meaning of life, death, and the
soul of human persons.
C. Balancing Life, Autonomy, and Religion
Regrettably, in living and dying, all people experience serious limitations to
the expression of their personal autonomy, regardless of their best-laid plans.
261
From a young age, a person's medical privacy is subject to frequent invasions
by parents and pediatricians. In growing older, people routinely share their
medical secrets with dozens of dentists, eye doctors, gastroenterologists, and
other medical professionals. Only by degrees do they attain greater
independence, until one day they realize they have begun to grow old, and must
begin, by degrees, to surrender back all the hard won gains of their
autonomy.262 For Terri, who was young and vital when she lost her physical
autonomy, the ability to express her wishes regarding anything vanished from
her, not by graceful degrees, but in a single moment of time.
Thus, there is a serious legal dilemma. Extracting Terri's "wishes" from the
sketchy recollections of self-interested roommates is not just a poor way to
determine her current inclinations regarding her medical privacy. It is virtually
impossible to ascertain her current autonomous choices without addressing
259. George Will, Discretionary Killing, in THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS AND OTHER SOBERING
THOUGHTS 61 (1978).
260. Arthur Kleinman, Do Not Go Gentle: The American Medical Way of Death, THE NEW
REPUBLIC at 28 (1990); Douglas 0. Linder, The Other Right-To-Life Debate: When Does
Fourteenth Amendment "Life" End?, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 1183, 1186 (1995).
261. Channick, supra note 93, at 621.
262. Id.
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either her spiritual essence or her ongoing intellectual presence, however
limited by her physical condition.263 Under a theory of functional personhood,
protecting the current medical autonomy of a person who has in effect ceased to
exist is simply absurd. Inventing an artificial consent to die on behalf of a
person who may still be present but whose current inclinations and personal
theology are unknown has the potential to destroy the very person whose
autonomy it is intended to protect.
264
Dworkin has rightly recognized that religion is a central feature of these life-
and-death social policy debates.265 He contends, for example, that there is a
fundamental unity between pro-abortion and anti-abortion theory, in that both
are attempts to establish the sanctity of a human life.266 The only real
differences lie in determination of whose life is viewed as sacred, and how best
to affirm that sacredness.267 The government's role would be to remain neutral,
allowing both communities to express their particular senses of the sacred as
they see fit, but only at the level of individual rights.268 For the government to
impose a particular template for sacredness on the larger society would involve
a violation of the first amendment, as each camp must be allowed to exercise its
religious freedom.269 The policy emerging from this doctrine is virtually
indistinguishable from typical pro-abortion policy. Thus, according to
Dworkin, even if both sides are in some sense right, constitutional religious
freedom mandates pro-choice policy.
270
Logically, this could be extended to the broader question of personhood.
The attempt to define a person ultimately devolves to an attempt to assign a
metaphysical value to some entity for purposes of extending to that entity a
bundle of rights and duties.271 In the context of human euthanasia, those
opposing euthanasia would tend to assign personhood to such an object based
on an explicitly religious theory that personhood is a categorical property that
263. Robert George, Always to Care, Never to Kill: Terri Schiavo and the Right to Life,
NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE, March 21, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/
George200503211140.asp.
264. James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, The Sirens'Lure Of Invented Consent: A Critique Of
Autonomy-Based Surrogate Decisionmaking For Legally-Incapacitated Older Persons, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 779, 815 (1991).
265. DwoRKIN, supra note 42; see also Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity Of Human Life, 103
YALE L.J. 2049 (1994) (reviewing DwORKiN, supra note 42).
266. DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 162-66.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Rakowski, supra note 265, at 2051 (commenting on DwoRKIN, supra note 42, at 273).
271. GEORGE, supra note 9, at 9-11.
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can be assigned without reference to instantiated functionality. Similarly, those
favoring euthanasia would tend to assign personhood to an object based on an
implicitly religious theory that possession of certain functionalities confers
sacredness to that object. Thus, per Dworkin's theorem, the government cannot
impose either view on the medical decision-making of private individuals
without violating their religious liberty. Whether by concurrent, precedent, or
artificial autonomy, no private decisions to refrain from life-sustaining
treatment would be subject to scrutiny other than potential abuse, coercion, and
such like. The resulting policy would be, once again, very like the pro-
euthanasia vision of reality.
The fatal flaw in both such schemes is that authentic government neutrality
with respect to religion is not an achievable condition.272 This deflection from
neutrality occurs on at least two levels. First, lawmakers are people, and these
people bring their own schema of things universal to the table when they
conceive legislation.273 Indeed, the modem view of the law is that it is little
more than "the codification of the will of the people," suggesting that the
culture from which legislators are selected provides a guide to the religious
theories that will surface in legislation. 274 Therefore, regardless of best efforts
to the contrary, legislation will ultimately bear the mark of the religious theories
of the people who construct it.275 Areas where religious presuppositions have
not been carefully examined are subject to the greatest likelihood of oblique
religious influences.
Second, judges are people too, and are equally capable of being carriers of
implicit religious paradigms, and cannot help but bring those paradigms into
the opinion-formation process.276 Thus, a judge whose personal religious
theory on the nature of personhood has a more Kantian than Boethian flavor,
and who may not even recognize the presence of such a paradigm, may
unwittingly (or wittingly) impose his views on helpless others. Furthermore, he
may do so with impunity, simply because he holds a view that is concordant
with the socio-theological majority of the moment, and because he is not
272. Id. at 41-42. See also RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR
DEMOCRACY (1996) (describing the seemingly irresolvable tension in religion clause
jurisprudence when attempting to maintain state neutrality without resorting to at least quasi-
religious reasoning).
273. Norman J. Singer, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality In The Writing
And Reading Of Statutes, in 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65A: 17 (6th ed.,
2000).
274. Scott C. Idleman, Article, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, And The
Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 83 (2002).
275. Id.
276. Idleman, supra note 217, at 517.
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deemed a state actor in such cases. This is the reason Dworkin's utopia ends up
looking just like the pro-euthanasia, pro-abortion utopia. It really is based on
the same overarching premise that individualistic autonomy is the primary
good. Dworkin is effectively saying that the ideal religion is his.
Because we now are beginning to see that "[t]he autonomy model cannot
provide answers to these questions,'2 77 we need to begin finding more realistic
limits to the use of "pretend" autonomy as the operating paradigm for rendering
life-ending decisions. Thus, perhaps the best and most consistent way to keep
the door open to the genuine exercise of autonomy is never to deliberately end
the life of the person whose autonomy is in doubt.2 78 Autonomy cannot exist
apart from the metaphysical premise that creates it.279 Therefore, the life
interest and the autonomy interest are coextensive to one another.280 This is
consistent with the holding in Cruzan, wherein a state may assert an unqualified
interest in the life of its citizens, while at the same time allowing its citizens to
resist unwanted medical intrusions of the state, as safeguarded by a jealous
regard for truth in end-of-life determinations.281 Yet it is possible to improve
upon the whispered truths of Cruzan.
VI. PROPOSALS: CAN INCAPACITY BE MADE SAFER
FOR BOTH LIFE AND AUTONOMY?
A. Clarify the Role of the State
One way to compel the necessary due diligence in end of life disputes is to
establish a rebuttable presumption that any judicial dispute resolution that
results in the termination of a human life is by definition an act of the state. If it
is contended that the state has merely acted on behalf of the incapacitated
person as a private actor, the role of the state should be consciously addressed
for what it is, a fiction designed to provide a convenient solution to a unique
problem. The state has added an invisible actor to the drama and has told him
or her what lines to say based on inconsistent and half-remembered
conversations, some of which may be self-interested fabrications. The state has
effectively attempted to read the mind and become the voice of the
incapacitated person.
277. Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46
RUTGERS L. REv. 609 (1994).
278. GEORGE, supra note 263.
279. GEORGE, supra note 9, at 9-11.
280. Id.
281. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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However, if the state knows it can trigger substantive due process right to
life claims when it has custody of the abstract autonomy interest of one of its
citizens, it will drive defensively. For example, in cases where there is a strong
potential to infringe on a cognitively disabled citizen's religious liberty interest,
perhaps it will handle that interest with greater care for the quality of evidence.
This could result in a significantly greater effort to achieve at least the same
level of certainty accorded to its other end of life judicial processes, and could
motivate the eventual unambiguous assertion of a federal standard of clear and
convincing evidence in such cases.
B. Create a Civil Habeas Corpus for the Cognitively Disabled
The district court, when confronted with the Schindlers' claim that death by
dehydration and starvation was cruel and unusual punishment, responded that
because Terri was not guilty of any crime, the state could properly subject her
to death by starvation and dehydration.8 2 Ostensibly, this was a recognition of
her prosthetic autonomy, her right to refuse treatment. Yet it has a distinctly
Orwellian feel of doublespeak.
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions have recognized that a deeper set of
principles animates the concern for the well-being of persons compelled to die
by an order of the state. For example, in 2004 the Tennessee Court of Appeals
observed that "[t]he state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel
and unusual punishments proscribe more than physically barbarous
punishment. They embody broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency. The basic concept underlying these
prohibitions is nothing less than human dignity.
28 3
To retain the certainty critical to end of life dispute resolution, and the
judicial credibility that accompanies it, the state must retain an active and
responsible role in the process. One way to do this is to analogize disputed end
of life cases to criminal executions and grant an automatic stay of execution to
allow one last full-scale federal review before ending the life of a person whose
will to live or die is not known beyond all reasonable doubt. This would be
styled as a federal civil habeas corpus for cognitively disabled persons. That is
in fact how the Schindlers' legal team viewed their request for injunctive
relief.28 4 The difficulty with such an analogy is that the sentencing judge in a
282. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
283. Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, No. M2003-01767-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2246227 at
*14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted).
284. Telephone interview with Barbara Weller (Schindler attorney); Telephone interview
with Andrew Schlafly of the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. (Transcript
on file with the Liberty University Law Review).
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criminal case is not normally a state actor for purposes of due process analysis.
However, as pointed out above, the involvement of the state in imposing the
state's religious theory of death on an incapacitated person is profoundly more
personal than simply deciding whether a competent person has committed
larceny or murder.
Therefore, a more lasting reform would result if the original federal
legislation proposed by Congressmen Martinez and Weldon were enacted
permanently into law as a civil equivalent to the criminal habeas corpus statute.
A civil habeas corpus for the cognitively disabled would act as a modem
Bateson's Belfry, a final opportunity to send a signal of life from the living
grave of a false PVS diagnosis. 285 This would be altogether consistent with the
life and liberty values that underpin the criminal habeas corpus:
Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its
history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental
rights of personal liberty. For its function has been to provide a
prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be
intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society,
government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's
imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform
with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled
to his immediate release. Thus there is nothing novel in the fact that
today habeas corpus in the federal courts provides a mode for the
redress of denials of due process of law. Vindication of due process
is precisely its historic office.286
Human dignity is an expression of respect for that human creature we are
willing to recognize as a person. Conferred on such persons are the rights and
duties of personhood. Among those rights are natural, but not prosthetic,
autonomy, and an inalienable right to life.
C. Use Better Science to Make Better Bioethical Choices
To determine the extent of a person's cognitive injury in a manner consistent
with equal protection, it is necessary to measure that person's condition against
a uniform, scientifically up-to-date, and accurate standard. Otherwise, casual,
285. Bateson's Belfry was a British invention of the 18th century designed to allay the
popular fear of being buried alive. It consisted of a coffin fitted with an external post at the top
of which there hung an iron bell. A cord ran from inside the coffin out to the bell, allowing one
who had been inadvertently interred to ring the bell and perchance be rescued. See generally
JAN BONDESON, BURIED ALIvE (2002).
286. Fayv. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,402 (1963).
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inaccurate, or biased evaluations will continue to produce rates of PVS
misdiagnosis as high as forty-three percent,28 7 creating an underclass of silent
and helpless victims, subject to the well-intended but under-informed and
unequally applied medical decisions of caregivers. Therefore, the medical
community primarily involved in the diagnosis and care of the severely
cognitively disabled must design and promulgate a set of national medical
standards for assessing degrees of cognitive injury that will provide the most
thorough diagnostic tools and the most optimistic treatment vectors achievable.
For example, the definition of "persistent vegetative state" is currently
undergoing serious challenges in the scientific community. With the advent of
the Functional MRI (fMRI), it is now possible to evaluate with much greater
precision the degree and kind of neurological activity occurring within the
human brain, damaged or otherwise.2 8 It offers the primitive beginnings of a
kind of mental x-ray, where the activity of specific neural groupings are
monitored in such detail that specific kinds of high order mental activity can be
revealed where before none could have been detected.2 89 Other advances are
waiting in the wings as well, such as possible uses of the recent discovery that
some who have been designated PVS may on occasion recover because there is
a slow but real restoration of the damaged neocortical tissue.29°
It is unthinkable that with the availability of such technology, society would
simply shut the door on one diagnosed under the older technology as PVS,
without really being sure who is "in there." If medical testing can be used to
"exonerate" a supposedly PVS patient through the detection of a vital thought
life in the darkened chambers of a damaged brain, that patient may be promoted
to a diagnosis of being in a Minimally Conscious State (MCS), and thus receive
better medical and legal treatment. Such patients, despite their "locked-in"
condition, can begin to hope for productive life someday, especially as modem
medical science begins to grapple with and discard its older categories of
cognitive disability.
291
287. Andrews et al., supra note 65, at 316.
288. Chad H. Moritz & Stephen L. Black'fM~l Reveals Large-Scale Network Activation in
Minimally Conscious Patients, 65 NEUROLOGY 1843 (2005).
289. Id.
290. Henning U. Voss, et al., Possible Axonal Regrowth in Late Recovery from the
Minimally Conscious State, 116 J. OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 2005 (2006), available at
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The fact that many have analogized the Schiavo case to questions of criminal
justice is not accidental. 2 It is part of the intuitive response that the machinery
of the law is producing an irrational product. Until the machine is fixed, there
must be meaningful, short-term remedies for those voiceless souls trapped
inside. Severely cognitively disabled persons struggling to reconnect with the
world of the moving before someone pulls the plug need one final opportunity
to tell the world they are still there, that they are still a person. A civil habeas
corpus for the severely cognitively disabled would go a long step in that
direction.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court stated that a commitment to the protection and
preservation of human life is a core value of all civilized nations, finding
universal expression in criminal punishment for murder:
Whether or not Missouri's clear and convincing evidence
requirement comports with the United States Constitution depends
in part on what interests the State may properly seek to protect in
this situation. Missouri relies on its interest in the protection and
preservation of human life, and there can be no gainsaying this
interest. As a general matter, the States - indeed, all civilized
nations - demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide
as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of States in this country
have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to
commit suicide. We do not think a State is required to remain
neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a
physically able adult to starve to death.293
Nevertheless, if the best anyone can do is to adjudicate constructive living
wills from the thinnest of evidentiary fabric using unexamined religious
premises packaged as concern for another's autonomy, it should not be
surprising when some raise the concern of potential abuse. When life is
entirely materialistic by definition, such that being a human is nothing but
being a body, then, when the body becomes defective, life becomes worthless.
Slippery slope arguments are probably subject to overuse in legal discourse.
Yet in cases such as Schiavo, a discernable trend to increase the granularity of
292. Andrew C. McCarthy, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Terri Schiavo has Been Denied
Due Process of Law, NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE, March 25,2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/
mccarthy/mccarthy200503250823.asp.
293. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,280 (1990).
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end of life decision-making using a materialistically grounded "quality of life"
principle as the differentiating mechanism should raise some alarm that the
system may lack stability.
By contrast, the monotheistic valuation of the person is rooted in a concept
of unconditional, personal love. 94 Those threads of theistic systems that see
the love of God as unconditional, likewise comprehend the valuation of human
persons not as contingent on meeting certain conditions, or falling above or
below some uncertain point on a "quality of life" continuum, but simply on the
intrinsic worth of God's image made evident in human form.295 Such an
unconditional valuation has the capacity to protect society and its individuals
from the specter of personhood by uncertain degrees as determined by
anonymous committees. That seems a worthy goal for a mature system of
jurisprudence.
This Comment has now put on the table various proposals to fix the
malfunctioning machinery of the law with respect to the autonomy of the
severely cognitively disabled. Each is promising in its own right, but deeper
questions remain. Are we moving in the direction of defining down the
disabled? If so, what would be the reasonable stopping point? When society as
a whole openly invites itself to define the disabled and the otherwise unwanted
as lower order beings in the spectrum of humanity, the strong and immediate
reaction of human conscience has historically been to recognize and reject such
a definition. A more subtle problem develops when smaller, niche categories
are formed that have a similar problem achieving personhood, but because they
are more diffuse and more obscure, they are less provoking to the social
296conscience.
Let us hope we can do better than to let the devaluation of persons happen by
default.
294. For example, John 3:16.
295. MoRELAND & RAE, supra note 25, at 324-25.
296. The boiling frog analogy is apropos here.
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